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http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20110809.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/fomcminutes20110809.pdf

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wParticipants discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery should the Committee judge that providing additional monetary accommodation was warranted.x

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wReinforcing the Committee's forward guidance about the likely path of monetary policy was seen as a possible way to reduce interest rates and provide greater support to the economic expansion; a few participants emphasized that guidance focusing solely on the state of the economy would be preferable to guidance that named specific spans of time or calendar dates.x

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wSome participants noted that additional asset purchases could be used to provide more accommodation by lowering longer-term interest rates. Others suggested that increasing the average maturity of the System's portfolio--perhaps by selling securities with relatively short remaining maturities and purchasing securities with relatively long remaining maturities--could have a similar effect on longer-term interest rates. Such an approach would not boost the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and the quantity of reserve balances.x

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wA few participants noted that a reduction in the interest rate paid on excess reserve balances could also be helpful in easing financial conditions.x

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wIn contrast, some participants judged that none of the tools available to the Committee would likely do much to promote a faster economic recovery, either because the headwinds that the economy faced would unwind only gradually and that process could not be accelerated with monetary policy or because recent events had significantly lowered the path of potential output.x

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http://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/stat/of110829.htm

http://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/stat/ba110829.htm

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http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110826a.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110826a.pdf

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E͍ŏɌiC̗ǂbĂ̂ł

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ŏ̂ApOt͔΂Ă̎B

wI can certainly appreciate these concerns and am fully aware of the challenges that we face in restoring economic and financial conditions conducive to healthy growth, some of which I will comment on today.x

ƂƂŁAûǂɁuIȉۑɊւĂbvƂ̂ƂŁB

wWith respect to longer-run prospects, however, my own view is more optimistic.x

ققB

wAs I will discuss, although important problems certainly exist, the growth fundamentals of the United States do not appear to have been permanently altered by the shocks of the past four years.x

u͊mɂ邪Ač̌oϐ̊Ղ͉ߋSNԂ̃VbNɂĉiɎꂽƂ͍lĂȂvƂ܂܂œǂނƌiC̗ǂbĂ̂łB

wIt may take some time, but we can reasonably expect to see a return to growth rates and employment levels consistent with those underlying fundamentals. In the interim, however, the challenges for U.S. economic policymakers are twofold: first, to help our economy further recover from the crisis and the ensuing recession, and second, to do so in a way that will allow the economy to realize its longer-term growth potential. Economic policies should be evaluated in light of both of those objectives.x

uԂ͂邩ȂvƂȂɁA̐ۑ肪ƂbĂ܂āA܂̍u̘͂błAtɌ΁uꂩ钆IȉۑȂƕč̌oϐ̊Ղ郊XNvƂȖł˂āB

wThis morning I will offer some thoughts on why the pace of recovery in the United States has, for the most part, proved disappointing thus far, and I will discuss the Federal Reserve's policy response. I will then turn briefly to the longer-term prospects of our economy and the need for our country's economic policies to be effective from both a shorter-term and longer-term perspective.x

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ƂƂōŏ̏ówNear-Term Prospects for the Economy and Policyxł܂B

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wWe meet here today almost exactly three years since the beginning of the most intense phase of the financial crisis and a bit more than two years since the National Bureau of Economic Research's date for the start of the economic recovery. Where do we stand?x

Ăǂł傤B

wThere have been some positive developments over the past few years, particularly when considered in the light of economic prospects as viewed at the depth of the crisis. Overall, the global economy has seen significant growth, led by the emerging-market economies.x

ƂƂŁAEoω񕜂̌͐VoςȁBł͕čɊւāB

wIn the United States, a cyclical recovery, though a modest one by historical standards, is in its ninth quarter. In the financial sphere, the U.S. banking system is generally much healthier now, with banks holding substantially more capital. Credit availability from banks has improved, though it remains tight in categories--such as small business lending--in which the balance sheets of potential borrowers remain impaired. Companies with access to the public bond markets have had no difficulty obtaining credit on favorable terms. Importantly, structural reform is moving forward in the financial sector, with ambitious domestic and international efforts underway to enhance the capital and liquidity of banks, especially the most systemically important banks; to improve risk management and transparency; to strengthen market infrastructure; and to introduce a more systemic, or macroprudential, approach to financial regulation and supervision.x

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EAoAƂ͂܂襥

wIn the broader economy, manufacturing production in the United States has risen nearly 15 percent since its trough, driven substantially by growth in exports. Indeed, the U.S. trade deficit has been notably lower recently than it was before the crisis, reflecting in part the improved competitiveness of U.S. goods and services.x

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wBusiness investment in equipment and software has continued to expand, and productivity gains in some industries have been impressive, though new data have reduced estimates of overall productivity improvement in recent years.x

Ƃ̐ݔ͊g債Aꕔ̎YƂł̐Y͈ۓIł邪S̓IȐỶP͌ĂƂȁB

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wHouseholds also have made some progress in repairing their balance sheets--saving more, borrowing less, and reducing their burdens of interest payments and debt.x

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wCommodity prices have come off their highs, which will reduce the cost pressures facing businesses and help increase household purchasing power.x

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wNotwithstanding these more positive developments, however, it is clear that the recovery from the crisis has been much less robust than we had hoped.x

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wFrom the latest comprehensive revisions to the national accounts as well as the most recent estimates of growth in the first half of this year, we have learned that the recession was even deeper and the recovery even weaker than we had thought; indeed, aggregate output in the United States still has not returned to the level that it attained before the crisis.x

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Ečoς̗݂̑ٗp̉P̒xɂ́u莝IȖ肪vƎwE

wImportantly, economic growth has for the most part been at rates insufficient to achieve sustained reductions in unemployment, which has recently been fluctuating a bit above 9 percent. Temporary factors, including the effects of the run-up in commodity prices on consumer and business budgets and the effect of the Japanese disaster on global supply chains and production, were part of the reason for the weak performance of the economy in the first half of 2011; accordingly, growth in the second half looks likely to improve as their influence recedes. However, the incoming data suggest that other, more persistent factors also have been at work.x

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EŁA̗v͉ł˂Ƃb

wWhy has the recovery from the crisis been so slow and erratic?x

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wHistorically, recessions have typically sowed the seeds of their own recoveries as reduced spending on investment, housing, and consumer durables generates pent-up demand.x

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wAs the business cycle bottoms out and confidence returns, this pent-up demand, often augmented by the effects of stimulative monetary and fiscal policies, is met through increased production and hiring. Increased production in turn boosts business revenues and household incomes and provides further impetus to business and household spending. x

wImproving income prospects and balance sheets also make households and businesses more creditworthy, and financial institutions become more willing to lend. Normally, these developments create a virtuous circle of rising incomes and profits, more supportive financial and credit conditions, and lower uncertainty, allowing the process of recovery to develop momentum. x

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EZbV̉񕜂x点錴ƂȂQ́u݁vAɏZsɊւ

wThese restorative forces are at work today, and they will continue to promote recovery over time. Unfortunately, the recession, besides being extraordinarily severe as well as global in scope, was also unusual in being associated with both a very deep slump in the housing market and a historic financial crisis. These two features of the downturn, individually and in combination, have acted to slow the natural recovery process.x

wNotably, the housing sector has been a significant driver of recovery from most recessions in the United States since World War II, but this time--with an overhang of distressed and foreclosed properties, tight credit conditions for builders and potential homebuyers, and ongoing concerns by both potential borrowers and lenders about continued house price declines--the rate of new home construction has remained at less than one-third of its pre-crisis level.x

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wThe low level of construction has implications not only for builders but for providers of a wide range of goods and services related to housing and homebuilding. Moreover, even as tight credit for some borrowers has been one of the factors restraining housing recovery, the weakness of the housing sector has in turn had adverse effects on financial markets and on the flow of credit. For example, the sharp declines in house prices in some areas have left many homeowners "underwater" on their mortgages, creating financial hardship for households and, through their effects on rates of mortgage delinquency and default, stress for financial institutions as well. Financial pressures on financial institutions and households have contributed, in turn, to greater caution in the extension of credit and to slower growth in consumer spending.x

łȂłȂƂ܂Av́uZ݂ނƊ֘Av₦܂vƂbƁAuZs̉񕜂xƃNWbg֘AP܂ˁAႦΏZ[̃lKeBuGNCeBƂAČlɂełˁvƂbłȁB

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wI have already noted the central role of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 in sparking the recession. As I also noted, a great deal has been done and is being done to address the causes and effects of the crisis, including a substantial program of financial reform, and conditions in the U.S. banking system and financial markets have improved significantly overall. Nevertheless, financial stress has been and continues to be a significant drag on the recovery, both here and abroad. x

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wBouts of sharp volatility and risk aversion in markets have recently re-emerged in reaction to concerns about both European sovereign debts and developments related to the U.S. fiscal situation, including the recent downgrade of the U.S. long-term credit rating by one of the major rating agencies and the controversy concerning the raising of the U.S. federal debt ceiling. It is difficult to judge by how much these developments have affected economic activity thus far, but there seems little doubt that they have hurt household and business confidence and that they pose ongoing risks to growth.x

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wThe Federal Reserve continues to monitor developments in financial markets and institutions closely and is in frequent contact with policymakers in Europe and elsewhere.x

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http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110826a.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110826a.pdf

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Commodity Price Gains: Speculation vs. Fundamentals
By Brett W. Fawley and Luciana Juvenal

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http://stlouisfed.org/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2011/c/commodities.pdf

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wThis synchronization of price movements across a range of commodities has fostered, in part, the assertion that the commodity price boom is a bubble, driven primarily by near-zero interest rates and excessive speculation in commodity futures markets.x

wThe counter argument is that market fundamentals-supply and demand for the commodities themselves-can fully explain the price gains. Ultimately, understanding the sources of the price gains is essential for determining the proper policy response, if any.x

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wIn the absence of "irrational exuberance," the price of any good or asset should be driven by supply and demand. On both the supply and demand side of commodities, there is no shortage of shocks to explain, at least in part, recent price gains.x

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wOverall, there is no doubt that fundamental shocks to supply and demand in commodities, both transitory and persistent, can account for significant price pressures in these markets. Some, however, remain unconvinced that these fundamental shocks are enough to explain the entirety of price increases. Instead, they place some blame on a bubble in commodity prices.x

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wAn asset bubble is characterized by prices detached from fundamentals, instead driven by the anticipation of profiting from higher prices tomorrow.x

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wCommodity markets, however, do not meet the usual theoretical criteria for a bubble.x

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wArguments for a speculative bubble focus primarily on one market-place for commodities: the futures market.x

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wCommodity futures markets are where both commercial and noncommercial traders can buy and sell standardized contracts for delivery of a specified quantity of goods at a specified date in the future. These contracts are short-term instruments that have few constraints on short-selling (betting on price decreases) and that are easy to arbitrage (profit risk-free from mispricing).x

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wIn contrast, theory holds that bubbles are limited to markets such as real estate, where the good in question has a long lifespan, is hard to sell before you own, and buying and selling is costly in terms of time and money.x

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wStill, some believe that a bubble is forming in commodities due to either expansionary U.S. monetary policy and/or record flows of investment funds into commodity futures. These possibilities warrant careful consideration.x

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wThe impact of increased speculation in commodity futures markets, perhaps exacerbated by low traditional investment returns, has been an area of intense research in recent years, however.x

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wLogical inconsistencies include a tenuous link between speculative inflows and demand for the underlying commodity and doubt over the extent that index fund investors could artificially increase futures and cash prices while only participating in the futures market and not the spot market, where commodities are sold for immediate delivery.x

wFactual inconsistencies are numerous. For example, inventories should have risen between 2006 and 2008 according to the bubble theory, but they actually fell.x

wOther reasons for discounting this theory include:

Earbitraging index-fund buying is fairly easy due to its predictable nature,
Ecommodity prices rose in markets with and without index funds,
Especulation was not excessive after accounting for hedging demand, and
Eprice impacts across markets were not consistent for the same level of index fund activity.x

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wIn addition to their own analysis, the authors of the OECD report reviewed four studies supporting a pre-recession commodity bubble and five studies discounting a bubble. The authors concluded that "the weight of the evidence at this point in time clearly tilts in favor of the argument that index funds did not cause a bubble in commodity futures prices." x

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Auction dateF23.08.2011
Payment F 25.08.2011
Date ofredemptionF23.02.2012
Total bids (CHF m)F8'829.00
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Allotment F599.80
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Commodity Price Gains: Speculation vs. Fundamentals
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The National and Regional Economic Outlook
August 18, 2011
Remarks at the New Jersey Performing Arts Center, Newark, New Jersey

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wThe statement issued by the Federal Open Market Committee earlier last week presents a sober assessment of the state of the U.S. economy. Economic growth so far in 2011 has been quite a bit slower than we expected earlier in the year. While jobs growth picked up early in the year, in the last few months conditions in the labor market have deteriorated again and the unemployment rate has edged up. Household spending has flattened out, and the housing sector is depressed. Business investment in equipment and software is expanding, but investment in corporate offices and other commercial buildings is weak.x

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wSome of the weakness in economic activity in the first half of the year was due to temporary factors such as the hit to household income from higher food and energy prices, and supply chain disruptions following the tragic earthquake in Japan. These restraining forces have abated and thus, we should see stronger growth in the second half. But it is clear that not all of the weakness was due to these one-time factors - and in light of this, I have revised down my expectations for the pace of recovery going forward.x

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wOn the inflation front, the committee noted that inflation has moderated recently as energy and commodity prices have declined from their peaks-having picked up earlier in the year, mainly reflecting higher prices for commodities and imported goods, as well as the supply disruptions from Japan. Longer term inflation expectations remain stable, and the committee now expects inflation to settle over the coming quarters at levels at or below those consistent with our mandate to promote full employment and price stability. x

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wIn light of the current outlook, the FOMC in its statement noted that we now anticipate that we are likely to keep short-term interest rates exceptionally low at least through mid-2013.x

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wWe also discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. Further details on the discussion at the meeting will be available when the minutes are published later this month. I will not comment on monetary policy any further today.x

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wFollowing the release of the FOMCfs statement, market interest rates generally moved lower, which should help provide some additional support for economic activity and jobs. I would note, however, that conditions remain unsettled and the equity market in particular has been quite volatile recently.x

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Connecting the Dots: Texas Employment Growth; a Dissenting Vote; and the Ugly Truth (With Reference to P.G. Wodehouse)
Remarks at the Midland Community Forum
Midland, Texas
August 17, 2011

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wNow to the second matter I wish to discuss with you today: my decision to dissent from the commitment of the majority of my colleagues on the FOMC in their decision to hold the base interest rate for interbank lending\the fed funds rate, the anchor of the yield curve\at its current level well into 2013.x

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wI voted against that commitment-cum-signal. In the pressf reporting of my dissenting vote and those of the other two members of the FOMC who voted against that commitment\Mr. Kocherlakota, my counterpart from the Minneapolis Fed, and Mr. Plosser, my counterpart from Philadelphia\there was substantial speculation as to the reasons for our dissent. I will let my other two colleagues speak for themselves; I can only speak for myself. Let me make clear why I was opposed to freezing the fed funds rate for two years. x

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wI have posited both within the FOMC and publicly for some time that there is abundant liquidity available to finance economic expansion and job creation in America. The banking system is awash with liquidity. It is a rare day when the discount windows\the lending facilities of the 12 Federal Reserve banks\experience significant activity. Domestic banks are flush; they have on deposit at the 12 Federal Reserve banks some $1.6 trillion in excess reserves, earning a mere 25 basis points\a quarter of 1 percent per annum\rather than earning significantly higher interest rates from making loans to operating businesses. These excess bank reserves are waiting on the sidelines to be lent to businesses. Nondepository financial firms-private equity funds and the like\have substantial amounts of investable cash at their disposal. U.S. corporations are sitting on an abundance of cash\some estimate excess working capital on publicly traded corporationsf books exceeds$1 trillion\well above their working capital needs. Nonpublicly held businesses that are creditworthy have increasing access to bank credit at historically low nominal rates.x

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wI have said many times that through the initiatives we took to counter the crisis of 2008-09, and the dramatic extension of the balance sheet that ensued, the Fed has refilled the tanks needed to fuel economic expansion and domestic job creation. Though I questioned the efficacy of the expansion of our balance sheet through the purchase of Treasury securities known as gQE2,h I have come to expect that the Federal Open Market Committee would continue to anchor the base lending rate at current levels and also maintain our abnormally large balance sheet, now with footings of almost $2.9 trillion, for gan extended period.hx 2008N̊@ȍ~FXƂƂbAƁupdQ̌ʂɂĂ͖ɋ^₪vƂ̂Ă̂[~OBŁApuR~bggǂ̂́vƂɂȂ܂B E߂ł̃Ct͌OĂȂ Ƃ̂͋jɈp܂Au悭̓Ct^Jhƌ܂ǂAɌł̓CtOĂ܂vƂbĂ镔ł́Ajɂƌ󂵂Ă܂āẢi]ł̖ɊւẮui]łiłアvǕ̏㏸}ł傤vƑz肵Ă܂BpB EO͌ݖĂ闬̃gX~bVJjYƂ wMy concern is with the transmission mechanism for activating the use of the liquidity we have created, which remains on the sidelines of the economy. I posit that nonmonetary factors, not monetary policy, are retarding the willingness and ability of job creators to put to work the liquidity that we have provided.x ݑʂɗĂ̂͋Zׂ̈ł͂ȂAZȊÕt@N^[ɂ̂łƂbȂ̂ŁA[ɁuRoĂČĂȂ̂͋Ẑł͂܂vƂbłAāuZŏo鎖͌E܂vƂbĂ̂ƓłȁB Eȉɑ΂鈫Ԃ܂ ɊȒPɂ܂Ƃ߂Ă܂܂ƁAuȂǁA̍KȂǂɊւĐʂɝ߂܂Ă鎖AԂsɑ΂s悤ɂȂǍʂƂēӗ~킬As̏ɋĂ闬g鎖Ăł搭͉ĂłvƂȂ̂łA܊pł̂ňp܂B wI have spoken to this many times in public. Those with the capacity to hire American workers\small businesses as well as large, publicly traded or private\are immobilized. Not because they lack entrepreneurial zeal or do not wish to grow; not because they canft access cheap and available credit. Rather, they simply cannot budget or manage for the uncertainty of fiscal and regulatory policy. In an environment where they are already uncertain of potential growth in demand for their goods and services and have yet to see a significant pickup in top-line revenue, there is palpable angst surrounding the cost of doing business. According to my business contacts, the opera buffa of the debt ceiling negotiations compounded this uncertainty, leaving business decisionmakers frozen in their tracks.x łȂiC񕜂̗͋ɊւĊmMĂAƂ̃}[Wmۂ̂߂ɂ̓RXgғ㏸őΉĂƂŁAĐs̍Ȃǂւ̕s钆ŊƂϋɓIȍsɏoȂłȁAƂƂĂ܂B ŁAXɈԂ̂łpƒȂ̂ŁÄԂ̌_B wMoreover, you might now say to yourself, gI understand from the Federal Reserve that I donft have to worry about the cost of borrowing for another two years. Given that I donft know how I am going to be hit by whatever new initiatives the Congress will come up with, but I do know that credit will remain cheap through the next election, what incentive do I have to invest and expand now? Why shouldnft I wait until the sky is clear?hx ɒ[ȋĈA܂[[ł(^^)B Eŝ悤ɂȂƂFւ̌O ŁAԂŘbI肩Ǝv܂ƁAŌ̕ɂȘ__QB wNo amount of monetary accommodation can substitute for that needed clarity. In fact, it can only make it worse if business comes to suspect that the central bank is laying the groundwork for eventually inflating our way out of our fiscal predicament rather than staying above the political fray-thus creating another tranche of uncertainty.x Zɘa̗ʂg債ĂݕKvƂĂsm̉ɂ͌qȂBāAs̊@ɍۂďɒʉ݂g傳ƂFƂȂǂɂ悤ɂȂꍇAʂ̈Ӗł̕smƂƂ̂悤ŁB Eo[iLvbgƂFĂ͂Ȃ ̍̕Ō̒߂uo[iLvbg͊ÂvƂx_[ɂoĂŁAjɂ̕X[̂͂̂ł܂ijB wIn the interest of full disclosure, I should add that I was also concerned that just by tweaking the language the way the committee did, our action might be interpreted as encouraging the view that there is an FOMC so-called gBernanke puth that would be too easily activated in response to a reversal in the financial markets.x enlbZs̃NNUɑ΂ĊȒPɊɘasƂɌ̂̓CNiCB wFor those of you unfamiliar with the expression gBernanke put,h or more generally, a gcentral bank put,h this term refers to the concept that a central bank will allow the stock market to rise significantly without tightening monetary policy, but will ease monetary policy whenever there is a stock market gcorrection.hx L^RB킴킴o[iLvbg̉܂łĂĂ܂(^^)Asꂪꍇɂ͒₪ɘasA㏸Ă̈߂AƂFus̃vbgIvVvƂ̂łƂJȉB wGiven the extent of the drop in the stock market leading up to and following Standard & Poorfs downgrade of U.S. debt, combined with the FOMCfs commitment to hold short-term rates near zero until mid-year 2013, some cynical observers might interpret such a policy action as a gBernanke put.hx ł́usome cynical observersvƈꉞT߂ɌĂ܂ǁAǂĂtBbV[́u̐lv悤ɂȂ̂̓PVJvƌ(^^)B wMy long-standing belief is that the Federal Reserve should never enact such asymmetric policies to protect stock market traders and investors. I believe my FOMC colleagues share this view. x eqa͊s̃g[_[ⓊƂ~ςׂɃp[iLvbgƂ悤Ȑ{ׂł͂ȂƂL^RĊłB Ƃ͂܂̃X[ wConnecting the DotsxĂ̂̂ŁAwNow, how do you connect the dots between Texasf record of economic growth and my dissenting vote?xƂbȂ̂łؗɃX[B ܂[IɌĂ܂ƁASĂ̒ł傫ȂR̏BǍٗpɂf[^Ĕ܂悤ɁAZ􂾂ł͂ȂKɘaȂǂoςɂƂďdvłA݂̍鐭̑ΗɎĂsm̂厖łĂȘbĂ܂ȁBŁAȂׂƂbŌ̕pB wThe sooner they get on it, the better. Uncertainty is corrosive; it is hurting job creation and capital expansion when we need it most. As Margaret Thatcher would say: gDonft dawdle. And donft go wobbly on us, Congress.h Monetary policy cannot substitute for what you must get on with doing. Get on with your job.x ŁAŌɁuX^vƂ̂ƂłAjɈp܂ǍČfB wI think I have made it pretty clear today that I believe what is restraining our economy is not monetary policy but fiscal misfeasance in Washington. We elect our national leaders to safeguard our country. An integral part of that consists of safeguarding the nationfs fiscal probity. Pointing fingers at the Fed only diminishes credibility\the ugly truth is that the problem lies not with monetary policy but in the need to construct a modern, appropriate set of fiscal and regulatory levers and pulleys to better incentivize the private sector to channel money into productive use in expanding our economy and enriching our people. Only Congress, working together with the president, has the power to write the rules and provide the incentives to correct the course of the great ship we know and love as America. 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Wodehouse) Remarks at the Midland Community Forum Midland, Texas August 17, 2011 ܂ڂ͗ɂďTɓǂޏł͂܂AenlbɔΕ[𓊂܂iدjƂӂ肩班XBueLXg̐^񒆕ӂɂ鏬owFOMC Decisionxǂ߂΃VAB̓rӂ肩B wI do not believe it wise to commit to more than that, or to signal further accommodation, when the cheap and abundant liquidity we have made available is presently lying fallow, and when the velocity of money remains so subdued as to be practically comatose. At the FOMC meeting, the committee announced that it gcurrently anticipates that economic conditions c are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.h In monetary parlance, that is language designed to signal that we are on hold until then. x wI voted against that commitment-cum-signal. In the pressf reporting of my dissenting vote and those of the other two members of the FOMC who voted against that commitment\Mr. Kocherlakota, my counterpart from the Minneapolis Fed, and Mr. Plosser, my counterpart from Philadelphia\there was substantial speculation as to the reasons for our dissent. I will let my other two colleagues speak for themselves; I can only speak for myself. Let me make clear why I was opposed to freezing the fed funds rate for two years.x ƂƂŁAȉ̔ΗR̐B wFirst, in reporting my views to the committee, I noted my concern for the fragility of the U.S. economy and weak job creation. It might be noted by the press here today that although I am constantly preoccupied with price stability\in the aviary of central bankers, I am known as a ghawkh on inflation\I did not voice concern for the prospect of inflationary pressures in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the Dallas Fedfs trimmed mean analysis of the inflationary developments in June indicated that the trimmed mean PCE turned in its softest reading of the year. The trimmed mean analysis we do at the Dallas Fed focuses on the price movements of personal consumption expenditures. It is an analysis that tracks the price movements of 178 items that people actually buy, such as beer, haircuts, shoe repair, food and energy prices. In June, the trimmed mean came in at an annualized rate of 1.3 percent, versus 2.1 percent for the first five months of the year. The 12-month rate was 1.5 percent.x ܂牴l̎uCt^JhvƂ₪邪Al͕ʂɂȂɒɃCtƂOĂ󂶂˂_XȀoĂ镨v₪Rm[AƋ̂悤łB wMy concern is not with immediate inflationary pressures. Core producer prices are still increasing at a higher than desirable rate. But I have suggested to my colleagues that while many companies have begun and will likely continue to raise prices to counter rising costs that derive from a range of factors-including the run-up of commodity prices in 2010 and increases in the costs of production in China-weak demand is beginning to temper the ability of providers of goods and services to significantly raise prices to consumers. x AɗCtւ̌OƂ͖̂̂́AƂ̐㕨㏸̉i]ł̓ꂾĂA̎ɊւĂ͌OĂ悤ŁB wMy concern is with the transmission mechanism for activating the use of the liquidity we have created, which remains on the sidelines of the economy. I posit that nonmonetary factors, not monetary policy, are retarding the willingness and ability of job creators to put to work the liquidity that we have provided.x [ƂŁA̋ZAƂedcĂ闬ɂĂǂ̂悤ɌĂ̂iɌٗpɂājɂĂ̌OƂ悤ȘbɂȂĂ悤ȋC񂾂AĂ܂ԑЂ肩݂Șbł͂܂ȁB Aꂩ炳pŏ̏ŃX[Ⴂ܂AԂtBbV[́uɌݏ\ȊɘaȂĂ̂Œǉł̊ɘa◬̎{͕KvȂvƂX^X̂悤łȁB ŁǍセ́uٗp̑noɊւāv݂ȘbXƂĂ̂łAǂł鎞Ԃ̂ōṒwThe Ugly TruthxƂȍB wI think I have made it pretty clear today that I believe what is restraining our economy is not monetary policy but fiscal misfeasance in Washington.x 傗et[_ wWe elect our national leaders to safeguard our country. An integral part of that consists of safeguarding the nationfs fiscal probity. Pointing fingers at the Fed only diminishes credibility\the ugly truth is that the problem lies not with monetary policy but in the need to construct a modern, appropriate set of fiscal and regulatory levers and pulleys to better incentivize the private sector to channel money into productive use in expanding our economy and enriching our people.x ܂͂ȂłꉞfA}f[gƂ̂ł搶B wOnly Congress, working together with the president, has the power to write the rules and provide the incentives to correct the course of the great ship we know and love as America. I hope you, as the voters who put them in office, will demand no less of them.x ܂_Ȃ̂₪悤Ȏ琭ƂȘbnA⑍قXƂłƂ͕̂č̗ǂƂłȂB [ƂŁAtBbV[ق̓fA}f[ĝdhłAƂ̂͑O炻łȂƂF͂܂AXɂ̊mFo܂ƂłB A_h[搶uĂ܂A͂PsǂłȂ̂łtqk\tďTǂށih肪吙jȂłǁjB http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2011/dud110818.html The National and Regional Economic Outlook August 18, 2011 William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Remarks at the New Jersey Performing Arts Center, Newark, New Jersey ƂƂĂ玞ԂȂ̂ł֘AGk EpdRĖ{ɓHHHH ܂mɓɂ͓Ǝv܂B]Ȃ݂ŋNĂ邱ƂŌ_i̍sׂ͖ܘ_Ȃ̂IɂǂƂbɂȂƂǂĂȂ炴𓾂܂񂩂˂ju͏㏸ǂiC͗ǂȂȂČǉׂ̈ɂ̂C~JlvƂɌꂻȏԂŁAȒłpdQ̂Ƃ̂̓cJVJB łȁAłpdPėƂZcĂ̂ł܂āA܂Zsɉ炩̃XgX|ăNWbgXvbh⃊XNv~AɕϒČoςɈe^AƂ悤ȓWJɂȂꍇɂ́AuZs̍vƂôłpdPƂMpɘaƂȎY͏o邩ȂƂ͎v̂ł܂āA܂̉\͂ȂƁB R[XƂ̂̂ł傤Aߏiłj̕tƕč̏ꍇllełƂ肪܂A܂ẲłuԂςΕʂ̒邩vƂ̂ŁAIƂĂ͗LƂ͎v܂Aꂾ̃RXgiZsꂪłRXgƉłԂɋNRtNg̉\ƂXNj|Ď{ĂȂڌoςɌ܂˂Ƃ̂܂ȂƂ̂B XɃcCXgIyŒĂǂ̂̂Ƃ̂܂A_ƂċZɘa􂪌oςɌ̂ł΁A͎Rɏ㏸iZɈ]nwǖԂł͓ɁjłāA[[ϓ_炷Ɓu͋ZŉvƂs͂̍ŝɖĂ邪ȂƂłȁB ܂Zsɉ炩̃XgX|ăXNIt[hɂȂĂ錋ʂƂĒɖʂɃXNv~A܂ĂƂ͈Ӗ邩ȂiXgX̌Oƒ͍}l^CYƌčXɉ΂\܂^^jǁA܂͌ǐǂɂ̂iPɃcCXgȂȒPAǂ̈ʂ̂Ƃʂǂv̂ƂoǂŔf̂Ƃ͓łjƎv܂Aڂ܂ȏ̌ʂ͒X҂łȂ悤ȊKXB ƍlƁAT̃WN\z[iŏ́uWN\z[WN\T̃RT[gz[ƎvĂ܂܂񂷂܂j̍uŉ̘b̂ꂪ܂ǂ݂ɂłȂƎv킯ŁA܂{͗Tji̓{Ԃł͖Ȃ̂Ōǐ^ʖڂɓǂނ͓̂yjɂȂ邪jƂƂł܂ȁB EIyGk Ԃ̂ŒPɃB ̋DIy http://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/stat/of110818.htm http://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/stat/ba110818.htm XQOȂĔɒɁÃIỹ[͖̂miҗvō̑啝m肵ĂȂ̂ŁjĂ̂14000~̃It@[ɑ΂15762~̉DƂ̓eD{낤ł܂ȁA񂤂B ̈ӖɂĂ̌u߂鎞Ԃ͖łeʂɃ}jAl^Ȃ̂ňȉB QOPP^OW^PW ul^̂łƊCOl^Eɏo҂V[Yv ܂łȁAčPON̂Tђx͍̓ŋ߂͌덷ԂȂ̂ŖČtłǂȋC܂ȁAƏł蓪Ă邠orz oς̃_ETChXNłɗグ咣҂Oցiandl^j V̋cv|l^΂ł܂A͂W̉plobcv|ôō͑l^ɂ܂ARȂQĂČłāÂ񑩂ł\グ悤ɁwThe immediate policy decisionx΂ߓǂ݂킳B RPpOtB wThe Committee set monetary policy in order to meet the inflation target in the medium term. Inflation had been well above the 2% target as a result of the temporary impact of higher energy and other commodity prices, the increase in the standard rate of VAT and the past depreciation of sterling.x ̕ӂ̔F͖Ȃ̂łB wCPI inflation had fallen in June, but it was judged likely to rise again temporarily, to reach 5% in the coming months, boosted by further increases in utility prices.x p̏ꍇ͍NɓĂd͂Ȃǂ̌ݏ㏸łB wThe Committeefs central view remained that inflation was likely to fall back in the medium term, as the impact of the factors raising inflation diminished and some downward pressure from a degree of slack in the labour market persisted. There were risks to that view, to the upside and the downside.x Ƃ܂̔FɊւĂ͑Oičp܂AjƓ悤ȏՂł͂̂łB RQpOtB wThe key upside risk continued to be that inflation would be elevated for longer than the Committee expected. That could be as a result of expectations of above-target inflation becoming embedded in wage and price-setting behaviour; the margin of spare capacity in the economy being less than currently thought; or of further shocks to the price level.x V̋cv|ł͕̃_ETChXN̕ɏĂ̂łA̓AbvTChXNɏĂ܂B ႠAbvTChxɂȂ̂Ɛ\܂ƁAɊւĂ͂̌㕨̃_ETChXNƂ͌oςɊւ_ETChXN̘bXƑƂ\ɂȂĂ܂̂ŁA܂\ケȂ̂悤ȋC܂B wWage growth remained subdued, which suggested that employees had not so far been able to secure higher pay increases in response to the recent squeeze on real incomes. Some measures of the longer-term inflation expectations of households had risen over the past year. But longer-term expectations of professional forecasters and financial market participants had been broadly stable. Overall, most indicators remained close to their series averages.x ㏸ɂ̒ቺɑΉڒグ͍̓̏܂茩ꂸAꕔ̃T[xCɂƉƌv̒IȃCt҂㏸Ă̂́Ȃ̃f[^猩ƒIȃCt҂͊Tˈ肵ĂƂ̂ƂŁB wNevertheless, CPI inflation was expected to reach 5% in the coming months, and it was unclear how medium-term inflation expectations would react. Margin levels in consumer-facing sectors probably remained below their pre-recession levels, and any attempt by those firms to rebuild their margins could put upward pressure on inflation.x Ҍ̃ZN^[ɂƂ̐ݒ肷}[WZbVO̐猩ƒႢÃ}[Wx񕜂悤Ƃ铮Nꍇɂ̓Ctւ̈グ͂ɂȂ蓾AƂbłA炭{_̕ł͂̕ӂɊւbwEĂƌiēǂ߂您OƂcbR~͂Ȃ悤ɁjB wThe indications that the pace of global growth was moderating suggested that energy and other commodity prices were less likely to continue rising. Import price pass-through from sterlingfs past depreciation appeared to be more or less complete, although the possibility of further pass-through could not be excluded.x ŐEoς̐݉ɂāip㏸̈ꗃSĂjGlM[т̑ۏiȉ㏸͎̎\AƂ͔̂̂łAς炸WuỶp͂悭͎̂͂̕łāA܂FɊւ{_ǂ߂΂Ԃ񂱂̓_ɂďĂ邩炻ǂ߂ΈӖƎvîł܂œǂނĵłAÃ|hɂeii]ŁjɂĂ͌ǂǂ̂Jł܂܂񂷂܂Buǂ̈ʉeĂ邩͔vƌĂ悤ȋC邪i܁jB ĂȖŁA͂܂܂̃AbvTChXN̘bɋLqȂĂł̊iOPQsAPTs^^jB ł͂̂łǍ̃_ETChXN̘buoς̃_ETChv̘băpOtRƂVAȓWJ(^^)B[ƂőRRpOtB wThe key risk to the downside remained that demand growth would not be sufficiently strong to absorb the pool of spare capacity in the economy, causing inflation to fall materially below target in the medium term. News over the month had generally reinforced the weak tone of indicators of global activity growth over the past few months, which had been particularly notable in data releases for the advanced economies. While some of the slowing would have reflected the impact of continuing disruption to global supply chains, and the effects of the elevated price of oil, the Committee judged it increasingly likely that the global slowdown would prove to be more prolonged than previously assumed.x ƂƂŁÃ_ETCh̕łuEIȌiC]z肵ĂpłvƂbĂ̂łA̐悪VɏoĂuoς̃_ETChXNvƂƂőRSpOtB wIn the United Kingdom, it was likely that underlying growth in the second quarter had been stronger than suggested by the headline number for GDP, but indicators of the evolution of activity in the near term had been subdued, especially for consumption and in the manufacturing sector.x šoϊ}ꂻL^RB wMuch of the moderation in UK manufacturing output appeared to be related to the slowdown in world activity, and the consequent implications for export orders. Business confidence had fallen, and appeared to be weighing on investment intentions, and perhaps also on employment growth.x Ƃ΂ɎcOȌʂB wThe lower path for Bank Rate now implied by market interest rates would serve partly to offset this weaker outlook. Evidence of slowing activity, and more particularly concerns about fiscal policy in the United States and the substantial challenges faced by the euro area, had resulted in stressed conditions in financial markets which were reflected in a wide range of asset classes. This had further elevated the funding costs faced by banks. If stress in financial markets persisted, it also had the potential to constrain banksf ability to raise as much term funding as they desired. In consequence, the price and availability of credit to many households and businesses could be adversely affected.x iCɗǂbĂand̐グʂ̂ƂɂiC̎h̘bŁAč̍Ɋւ錜Oɂoϊ̒ቺƂA[̋ZsɂXgX̖ƂAɂĔp̋Z̈ƂA낭łȂʂԕԁBŁȂRTpOtB wThe greatest risk to the downside stemmed from the euro area.x hThe greatest riskhL^RB wConcerns about the euro area were likely already to be affecting the economic outlook through their impact on asset prices, bank funding costs and the level of household and business confidence. Reflecting that, the Committeefs projections were conditioned on relatively slow growth in the euro area. There were, however, additional risks relating to a significant further intensification of concerns.x [ƂŃ[̖肪ő̃XNȂ̂łB wThese could affect the United Kingdom through a number of channels, including: the impact a further slowing in euro-area activity would have on UK exports; financial and banking sector interlinkages; and possibly, and perhaps most significantly, through a disruption to the functioning of the international financial system more generally - hitting global asset prices, wholesale funding markets, and business and household confidence.x ƂƂŁApoςɐFXȃlňe^ƂbłAɌOĂ̂ۓIȋZs̋@\ቺɂĔł낤EIȎYỉZZsł̃t@fBOւ̈eARtBfẌȂǂOƁA܂v茜OĂ܂ȁB wThose additional risks were almost impossible to calibrate in terms of their probability or impact. Members of the Committee held differing views about the extent to which those risks should influence the Committeefs immediate policy decision. On balance, most members saw little merit in seeking to react to the possibility of these risks crystallising by adjusting monetary policy in advance.x ܂ł͂̃XŇ݉ɐ삯ĒǉIȑ[usbg͑̈ψ͂܂ĂȂƂƂł͂܂B [ƂőRUpOtB wThere remained substantial risks to inflation in the medium term in both directions. But overall the news on the month had increased the downside risks. Committee members considered the cases for different policy actions.x ƂƂŁA_ETChXNg債ƂbɂȂĂ܂Aĕ̃_ETChƂ͌oς̃_ETChl[mĩAbvTCh̘bȂɏ[Ă₪邵jƂCłȂB ĂȗɂȂ܂āÁuグāv̂Q͒Ă߂ł̊ƂȂAƂł܂AȂĂ̂łƂ肠͋cv|ǂłƂ[ƂŁi蔲jB XCXɂo҂ł XɃU[u^[Qbgg傷rma http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20110817/source/pre_20110817.en.pdf Swiss National Bank intensifies measures against strong Swiss franc wThe measures taken thus far by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) against the strength of the Swiss franc are having an impact. Nevertheless, the Swiss franc remains massively overvalued. The SNB has therefore decided to expand again significantly the supply of liquidity to the Swiss franc money market.x ₠̒ǉłǂǂ񂨂ĂƂ̂́uCpNgvƂbȂ̂ƂcbR~Ȃ邪܂l̑ΉŖقĂB wIn so doing, it is increasing the downward pressure on money market interest rates with a view to further weakening the Swiss franc exchange rate. With immediate effect, it aims to expand banksf sight deposits at the SNB further, from CHF 120 billion to CHF 200 billion. In order to achieve this new target level as quickly as possible, it will continue to repurchase outstanding SNB Bills and to employ foreign exchange swaps. Furthermore, the SNB reiterates that it will, if necessary, take further measures against the strength of the Swiss franc.x ܂撣ĂƂłB http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90900001&sid=akAUdTVs3J5M mxOׁFtÃybOϑ͌|h͉ ܂ybOČŌ̂ƎۂɂɗƂނ̂Ƃ̊Ԃɂ͂ȂzǂƎv̂ł񂵂āA߂ăNNsɂȂב֎seqhXƂł͂܂B čł͒nA⑍قt[_𑁑JnĂ܂IIII RR^ق̈ٗƂ^jƂԂȁu{Nɔ΂Rɔ邨vU΂łAƃx_[ƑfGȓWJɂȂĂ悤ŁAɋ̔MȂWJł܂B http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=jp09_newsarchive&sid=amtWbEla3mY4 u[hفFp͐Vȍw̃VOił͂Ȃ(1) wW16iu[o[OjFăZgCXÃu[hق͕ĘAMxieqajȂƂ2013N΂܂ŒێƖ񑩂Ƃ́AVȍw̃VOiƂ݂Ȃׂł͂ȂƂ̌𖾂炩ɂBxiLURLj http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90900001&sid=aum7HoDnzbLY _XA⑍فFeqaɊg[_[𑹎ی삷Kv͂Ȃ wW17iu[o[OjF_XÃtBbV[ق́AĊꂪ啝ɉƂĂ̂тɋZɘaׂł͂ȂƏqׁAsg[_[̖ڂɂ́uo[iLEvbgvƉf\ƌxBxiLURLj http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90900001&sid=aj.ytLAGWoJo tBftBAA⑍فF13N΂OɗグKvƂȂZ wW17iu[o[OjFătBftBAÃvbT[ق́AĘAMJsψienlbj͋炭2013N΂Oɗグ{KvƂ̌B܂ǎ҂͉ߋŒᐅ̐QNԈێƂ̕j𖾎OɁAoϏׂƎwEBxiLURLj オĎQ܂IIIII tBbV[ƃvbT[̓RR^قƓlɔΕ[˂񂾂RlȂ̂ł܂̂ŁA܂b͓̂OႠOȂ̂łAu[hق͍NpdQiƂƂj{̕Kvg̃y[p[ŁufBXCtԂɂȂɒ𒷊Ԃɂ킽Čp鎖͌oςftύt̏ԂɑJڂ郊XNvƎ咣ĂЂƂŁA܂R~bggIȐɗ^ȂȐlł͂̂łA܂Ŕ΂̐lt[_ƁAR~bgg𔺂ȂuԎǂv́AiC邢͕ƍD]ł̎Ԏǂ󂵂ĒZsꂪȃQQ}[CɂȂ郊XNXɍ߂ƂƂ̂̓j|[̊Fl͂QOORNŌoς݂ł܂̂ŃCNZXƎv܂AJl͏̃P[Xł̂ŁuQNԃ[qbn[vƂɑSŃ}[CIƂ肻ōy݂ɑ҂Ă܂(^^)B l̂ӂǂV[Y what_a_dudeƂ̍ŐVGg[ixxl^ɂĒkłjȂGB http://d.hatena.ne.jp/what_a_dude/20110817 2011-08-17 ꂽR[ĥ悤Ƀ}l^[x[X̘b𑱂鉴 wv̓}l^[x[X𑝉ĂƁAsɎꂾ킯łAvHĂ܂_ł瑝₵ĂقƂǌʂȂAƂƂƎv̂łBxiLGg[j IɂiwƂvƂȂ͋ʈꎟłwŊm̖Ŏ_܂orzjłAȊȂƂ͎v̂łāAȂ܂ƁuǂĎ̌oςɎ𗬂邩vƂ̂ZƂčlAƂ̂[񂪂ĎvHł̍HvAƂɂȂ̂ƂӂƎv񂷁B ܂ȂƂ͕SmŁuՋIyvƂ{ĂƎv̂łǂA[[炷ƂdseĎד͎דȂłǂAȁ[蒼ړIȌʂ肻ȋCłˁB܂dsel̂܂܃bL[ƌċsaɋ˂񂾂Ӗ̂ȂǥB AZ͂ē̃[gŃ^[͉肫Ă܂Â炵ċ玑vôČ獡X֌W˂ƂłāA͂莑Yiɒړ|悤ȃ[gsȋCB񕾊QiƂԂ肻ĵŊmɃGC[ł邱ƂȂ̂ƂTdȔf͕KvƂ͎v̂łAoϏ܂肻Ȃ̂т肵ĂȂƂ̂ł΁AYgĂdseƂƔ̂@Ȃ񂶂Ȃ̂ȁAȂǂƖx\グĂ邱ƂɊւĂӂƎvyĂ݂̂what_a_dudẽGg[𖍂ɎGkĂ݂łǂ܂B 炭č́üvɂĂ悤ȔY݂悤ȊKXBč̏ꍇ͂͂Ăx[X̃Ct{ƔׂĂ͍̂Ń[g͓{肻ł QOPP^OW^PV uPNsaDF^܂l^ōX̂and֘Av ܂łȁAɊւĂ͕ʂɒK킹ȂĂǂ̂őmCƎlS@B PNsaDL^R ̂PNsaDʂ͂B http://www.mof.go.jp/jgbs/auction/calendar/tbill/tbill_nyusatsu/resul230816.htm i3jŒቿi 99~89K2 iōj i0.1084j i5jωi 99~89K5 iϗ ji0.1053j ܂Tj̊Z̃[goオ0.101/0.100Ȃ̂łA܂0.11͊yŊ܂ȂƂȂ̂ł傤AőPN܂0.10ɂւ΂ł̊Ƃ[gɂȂĂ܂āAȂ܂ł̃^[}ʁB ō̎IyȂłǂˁB It@[ http://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/stat/of110816.htm http://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/stat/ba110816.htm ʒSێi{XjDi818X^[gj 12,775 8,006 0.100 0.100 62.7 ƂƂŁÃIy͂WPWXV̊ԂłAD܂āATj̃IyiWPUXV̂P~jɈD߂Ƒ܂BቺiIt@[zĂ܂̂ŐΊzƂẲD͍̕ȂłjƂȂĂ܂āA܂̂炢̏ɑ̂g̗ǂIyւ̃j[Y܂ƂłȁB ܂ɊւĂ͌ŒIy̑̌ʂƂĂt@fBOV[gCɂȂĂÄłPN̂sa̓[gؗɒቺƂ[̓ƂȂ킢̂ŃĂ݂̘bł͂܂B̂قƐFXƖCvP[VꂻȂ̂łA܂͖ϑz̐EɂȂ܂̂ł͊B Wcv|oƂ̂ɍX̂Vandcv|l^ [ƁA{and͂Wlob̋cv|ôŁAl^ƂĂނтĂ܂܂XȂVcv|i͂⍡Xl^Ȃ̂ŁjȒPɏXiô͐挎QOł܂񂷂܂jB http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2011/mpc1107.pdf ȒPɌ̂ł܂́wThe immediate policy decisionx猩̂gB EɊւ郊XNu㉺ɌɊgvƂX̔Y܂ QQpOtB wInflation had been well above the 2% target as a result of the temporary boost from higher energy and other commodity prices, the increase in the standard rate of VAT and the past depreciation of sterling. Despite the fall in CPI inflation in June, it was likely that inflation would rise further, to over 5%, in the coming months.x ܂ς炸Ȃłu͈ꎞIvłQŐڂĂ܂Aڐ͂Tʂɏ㏸܂ˁvƂb͑ς炸B wIn the light of recent developments in utility and food prices, the peak in inflation was likely to be a little higher and come sooner than the Committee had previously expected.x [B wThe Committeefs central view remained that a margin of spare capacity in the economy was likely to push down inflation and bring it back towards the target in the medium term, as the impact of the factors temporarily boosting inflation subsided.x ̕񓯂悤ɌĂ܂āA܂oԂłȂƂB wBut there were material risks to that view, both to the upside and to the downside. The Committee discussed how those risks had evolved since its previous meeting.x ƂƂŁA̐Ƀ_ETChƃAbvTCh̘bāAꂪ܂₽߂]Δ䒷ȂĂ̂łAFXƂłȂłȂƂ__ł̂ŌĂ݂܂B ẼXNɊւāu_ETChXNvɏô[~O QRpOtB wThe key risk to the downside was that demand growth would not be sufficiently strong to soak up the pool of spare capacity in the economy, leading inflation to fall materially below the target in the medium term.x Ƃ̂͂܂ƓłA͑O܂łƈă_ETChXNɗĂiUcv|ł͐ɃAbvTChXN̘bĂĵ킢̐[Ƃł܂B wThe latest indicators suggested that the pace of global activity had slowed, although it was not clear how persistent this would prove to be. Some of the slowing in global activity reflected the temporary impact of the continuing disruption to supply chains caused by the Japanese earthquake and tsunami in March, and the effects of the elevated price of oil.x ł܂{̓o[iL̋c،iVPRjƔrẴl^oƃI[̂łǂAVUV̎_łand̐ψ́uEoςĂ鎖ɂĂ̎͂悭ȂƂ낪܂Aꕔ͈ꎞIvɂ̂ł傤vƂ悤ȘbĂ܂āAŃo[iLc͋c،ŎƂ̒ቺɊւāuꎞIȗvłiدjvƌĂŁiWenlbŁuψꎞIvȂˁAewbvƂ[ƕύX܂jA̕ӂX킢ȂƂbƎvĂ邤ɂenlbIĂ܂Iɂ͎ɂiƉ͎̂cOOi||jB wThe risks posed by an intensification of the sovereign debt and banking problems within the euro area to the prospects for economic activity and the financial system at home had remained substantial. The funding costs faced by the major UK banks remained elevated, in part reflecting those risks emanating from within the euro area, and were likely to continue to affect the price and availability of credit to many households and businesses adversely.x ̂Ƃ낪__ƂĂققƎv̂łAB̉Boςɑ΂êقɁAp̋s̃t@fBORXg̏㏸ɂ閯Ԃ̃NWbgAxCreB̒ቺɂĂ̂킢܂BȂ݂ɂ̉p̋s̑ݏoԓxǂ̂̂Ƃl^͑PTpOtŏڂb܂̂łɂȕ͂ǂB wIndicators had pointed towards continued modest underlying UK GDP growth in the second quarter and, more tentatively, to some softening in the outlook for the third quarter. But the implications of weaker activity for inflation would depend on the factors that had caused it. Partly in response to the more downbeat news on the outlook for economic activity, investors had put back their central estimate of when official interest rates would begin to rise and the sterling effective exchange rate had fallen modestly. This was likely, in time, to provide some countervailing stimulus to economic activity.x ̕̕ققƎvłAšoόʂアƂʂCtɗ^e͂ǂ̃t@N^[ɂĈقȂĂƂꌩHHHȘbĂ悤ɓǂ߂܂A\ƂĂĂ̂iČʂグ҉̂p|hoςւ̊ɘaIʂƂ[g܂˂Ƃ̂ȁB E񂵂ɂȂAbvTChXNł__ɂĂׂ͍ȂĂ܂ ŃAbvTChXNȂłǂꂪQSpOtB wThe key risk to the upside was that the period of elevated inflation would persist for longer than the Committee expected. Expectations of above-target inflation could become entrenched in price and wage-setting behaviour; employees might press harder for wage increases in response to recent declines in living standards; or there might be further upward pressure on prices arising from energy and other internationally traded goods prices.x ܂xbĂ̂łA܂͏]Iȕ̍~܂肪^̓IȐlX̍sɊւeɂďڂĂ̂킢܂B wAccording to one survey-based measure, householdsfexpectations of inflation in the medium term had increased markedly, to a little above their previous peak in 2008. But measures of inflation expectations derived from financial markets had been stable.x Zsꂩ̃Ct҂͈肵Ă̂́AƌṽCt҂ɊւT[xCf[^͏㏸XɂƂ̂͂A[ȘbB wThere was no clear evidence that higher inflation expectations had begun to feed through into wage-setting behaviour. Earnings growth had remained subdued. But earnings growth was affected by a range of factors, making it hard to infer clearly what impact inflation expectations might have had. It remained unclear how much comfort to draw from recent labour market developments, given the puzzling behaviour of productivity over the recent past.x ƂƂŁAł͕̍~܂肩㏸ƂXpC͓̒iȂ悤łA̒ɂĂ͏\mFKvƂbłȁAƃ[}VbNŗ񂾐Y̖Ƃ̂͂Űcv|łłȂłȂƂ܂A܂ƂƂɂȂĂ܂ȁB EŌǁuŋ߂̓͗グ̕Kv܂vƂb QUpOtB wMost members judged that it was appropriate to maintain the current stance of monetary policy at this meeting.x ێłłB wIt was likely that the current weakness in activity would persist for longer than previously thought, although the reduction over the month in the exchange rate and in market interest rates would provide some countervailing stimulus to the economy.x |hƋቺoςւ̎hʂoĂ̂́AƂ̌oς̎コ͏]lob\zĂpƌƁA܂̎_łand̐ψ͂oςɎCCɂȂĂƂłˁB wThat weakness, together with the continued subdued behaviour of earnings, reinforced the case that inflation was likely to fall back once the temporary impact of the factors pushing up on it had waned.x ł܂̎コ܂AXɂ͒̏㏸}Ă邱ƂCt͈ꎞIȕ㏸v̔ƋɃ^[Qbgߕӂɒቺł傤ƁB wBut there also remained upside risks associated with the sustained period of above-target inflation.x ܂CtɊւĂ̓AbvTChXN܂B wThere was a range of views on the balance of these downside and upside risks. 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At its last meeting on August 9, the Committee took what I viewed as a significant policy step. I dissented from its decision. I believe that transparency is an essential part of effective policy formation, and so Ifm offering this brief explanation of my decision. These views are not necessarily those of others on the Federal Open Market Committee, including presidents Richard Fisher and Charles Plosser.x ƂƂŁÂenlbŎgΕ[𓊂ɂāA̔wiїRƂȂ̂łAûenlb̌̓RR^قɌȐXebvłvƂFŁAu͋Zɂ{IȕłƔFĂ̂ŁA̔΍sɊւĐ邱Ƃɂ܂vƂƂłBRȂ炱̔ΗR̓tBbV[قƃvbT[ق̔ΗRƂ͊֌WȂłƁB ܂łȁAĊmɃRR^ق̌̂łǂǍĕtƂĂ͂enlb̌RTԒxŋcv|iMinutejoƂɂȂĂāAł͋cĂւ̎^ۂƔے̏ꍇ̗͂RɂĊȒPɐAƂłāAċcv|oOɐ[̂ȂƂ͂łȂB ɂłˁAꂽR[hԁi΂΂܂łjƂȂĐ\グĂ܂悤ɁAԎ{܂傤Ƃ̂ł΁A̎̃t[_Ďs̊҂pĕs艻郊XN܂ȂƂl܂ƁAʏ̋ZĂƂɂ͂܂RR^ق̂̓Č̂́u₷ċXvƂȂ̂ł傤AԎ̌ʂ𗘂ɍsƂĂîł΁A̘błj󋵂ɂĂ͓KS\ł͂ȂƂ낤Ƒ܂A͂B wEntering the meeting, the FOMC was following an unprecedentedly accommodative monetary policy. There were three elements to this policy.x ƂƂŁARR^قenlb́uٗ̊ɘav͂R̃|Cg悤łB wFirst, the Federal Reserve owned over$2.5 trillion of long-term government and government-backed securities. The purchase of the final \$600 billion of these assets was announced in November 2010 and completed by the end of June 2011.x

wSecond, as it had since December 2008, the Committee was maintaining the fed funds rate at between 0 and 25 basis points.x

wThird, as it had since March 2009, the Committee statement included the forward guidance that it anticipated keeping the fed funds rate at this low level for gan extended period.h The gextended periodh is generally interpreted as being between three and six months. x

[ƂŁiPjY̔AiQjUڕW0-0.25AiRjKC_Xgan extended period.hƂ̂|CgŁAύXɂȂ̂͂ē̂悤ɂ́iRjłȁBŁAʓIɂ͂́gan extended periodhRUx̊ԂӖƉ߂Ă܂AƃRR^ق͔FB

wThe Committee adopted this three-part policy stance in November 2010. I agreed with this decision and supported it publicly at that time and throughout this year.x

QOPONPPipdQ{j猻݂̃ZbgizȂǂ܂߂ājɂȂĂ܂ƁB

wIn its August 9 meeting, the Committee changed this gextended periodh language to say instead that it gcurrently anticipates economic conditions c are likely to warrant extraordinarily low levels of the federal funds rate through mid-2013.hx

łȁB

wThis statement is designed to let the public know that the fed funds rate is likely to stay between 0 and 25 basis points over the next two years, not just over the next three to six months. Hence, the new language is intended to provide more monetary accommodation than before.x

ƂƂŁARR^ق̉߂ƂẮA܂Ӗɂ߂đfȂ̂łAuenlbł̃KC_X́A݂̐0-0.25ɗ܂ԂɊւĎĂÃKC_XύXɂĂ̊ԂwRUxwQNxɊg傳̂ŁAύX͒ǉIȊɘaʂ^vƂ߂ɂȂĂ܂B

łłȁA܂mɊԂт̂ł炻͂ŊɘaʂႠɘaʂȂ̂łǂA܂ł́u_ł̌ʂvłāAʂɊmł͂ȂƂ_ɒӂKvȂ̂ƁAPĉP_ɂȂĂ̂ŎԂ̌o߂Ƌɂ̃KC_Xǂ̂Ƃ̂₱ɂȂĂ悤Ɏv܂ǁA܂̕ӂɊւGk͎UX\グ̂(^^)B

wI dissented from this change in language because the evolution of macroeconomic data did not reflect a need to make monetary policy more accommodative than in November 2010. In particular, personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation rose notably in the first half of 2011, whether or not one includes food and energy. At the same time, while unemployment does remain disturbingly high, it has fallen since November.x

ƂƂŁAŔΗRɂĂ̐ƂȂ܂ARR^ق̔ΗR͒Xg[gŌoϔFɊÂ̂łāAKC_X̃R~jP[V̖iႦΖIȃCt^[QbgƂAԎ̃R~bgg̕@ɖ肪̂ł͂Ƃ̂ł͂ȂAƂӖjƂbł͂ȂA܂ł̃KC_XύXuǉIȊɘaʂóvƂđĔ΂Ă܂B

܂Aɂ܂悤ɁAN̂pdQ{_ƔrꍇɁAoϏ󋵂͉PĂAǉIȋZɘa􂪕KvȎł͂ȂƂӌł܂BŁAfA}f[gɑ΂__Ō΁AɊւČΖ{NOɂPCEwwbhCRAɏ㏸ĂAƗ̍~܂͋Cł͂邪A܂2011N11̎_͉PĂAƐĂ܂ȁB

wI can summarize my reasoning as follows. I believe that in November, the Committee judiciously chose a level of accommodation that was well calibrated for the prevailing economic conditions. Since November, inflation has risen and unemployment has fallen. I do not believe that providing more accommodation-easing monetary policy-is the appropriate response to these changes in the economy. x

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wGoing forward, my votes on monetary policy will continue to be based on the evolution of the data on PCE inflation and its components, medium-term PCE inflation expectations, and unemployment. x

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http://www.boj.or.jp/announcements/release_2003/k031010.htm/

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http://jp.reuters.com/article/forexNews/idJPnJT896776220110811
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2011N 08 11 23:30 JST

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http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-22667020110811
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2011N 08 11 15:19 JST

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Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)

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wQuestion: I would like to ask about the intervention in the forex market of Japan. Are you in support of that, and is it also the same recognition as the consolidated intervention in March? Is it critical or not? Is it some kind of critical movement or decision? How do you evaluate this decision?x

orz

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wTrichet: I will only say that we have a very clear position in the Governing Council of the ECB. We consider that such interventions have to be made on the basis of a multilateral consensus and a multilateral decision. That is our position. Itfs a clear-cut position that we have always had. To my knowledge what has been done is not part of a multilateral decision.x

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http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20110810/source/pre_20110810.en.pdf
Swiss National Bank expands measures against strong Swiss franc

wThe substantial rise in risk aversion on the international financial markets has further intensified the overvaluation of the Swiss franc in the last few days. In the light of these developments, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is taking additional measures against the strength of the Swiss franc. It will again significantly increase the supply of liquidity to the Swiss franc money market. The SNB aims to rapidly expand banksf sight deposits at the SNB from currently CHF 80 billion to CHF 120 billion.x

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wTo accelerate the increase in Swiss franc liquidity, the SNB will additionally conduct foreign exchange swap transactions. The foreign exchange swap is a monetary policy instrument which the SNB uses to create Swiss franc liquidity. It was last employed in autumn 2008.x

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wThe massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc poses a threat to the development of the economy in Switzerland and has further increased the downside risks to price stability. The SNB is keeping a close watch on developments on the foreign exchange market and on financial markets. If necessary, it will take further measures against the strength of the Swiss franc.x

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wAlso, recent labor market indicators have been weaker than anticipated. The slower pace of the recovery reflects in part factors that are likely to be temporary, including the damping effect of higher food and energy prices on consumer purchasing power and spending as well as supply chain disruptions associated with the tragic events in Japan. Household spending and business investment in equipment and software continue to expand. However, investment in nonresidential structures is still weak, and the housing sector continues to be depressed. xiOj

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wTemporary factors, including the damping effect of higher food and energy prices on consumer purchasing power and spending as well as supply chain disruptions associated with the tragic events in Japan, appear to account for only some of the recent weakness in economic activity. xij

wThe slower pace of the recovery reflects in part factors that are likely to be temporary, including the damping effect of higher food and energy prices on consumer purchasing power and spending as well as supply chain disruptions associated with the tragic events in Japan. xiOiقǈp̂̈ꕔČfjj

EɊւĂɎアbɁĩpOtŌʂj

wInflation picked up earlier in the year, mainly reflecting higher prices for some commodities and imported goods, as well as the supply chain disruptions. More recently, inflation has moderated as prices of energy and some commodities have declined from their earlier peaks. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.xij

wInflation has picked up in recent months, mainly reflecting higher prices for some commodities and imported goods, as well as the recent supply chain disruptions. However, longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.xiOj

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wConsistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. xij

͂̕ł̂ł܂X[iOƓłj

EiC񕜃y[XюƗP̌ʂɂ

wThe Committee now expects a somewhat slower pace of recovery over coming quarters than it did at the time of the previous meeting and anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only gradually toward levels that the Committee judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. xij

wThe unemployment rate remains elevated; however, the Committee expects the pace of recovery to pick up over coming quarters and the unemployment rate to resume its gradual decline toward levels that the Committee judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. xiOj

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wMoreover, downside risks to the economic outlook have increased. xij

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wThe Committee also anticipates that inflation will settle, over coming quarters, at levels at or below those consistent with the Committee's dual mandate as the effects of past energy and other commodity price increases dissipate further.xij

wInflation has moved up recently, but the Committee anticipates that inflation will subside to levels at or below those consistent with the Committee's dual mandate as the effects of past energy and other commodity price increases dissipate.xiOj

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wHowever, the Committee will continue to pay close attention to the evolution of inflation and inflation expectations. xij

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wTo promote the ongoing economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent.xij

eeU0-0.25ɂƂb͑OƓȂ̂ŃX[B

wThe Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.xij

wThe Committee continues to anticipate that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period.xiOj

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wThe Committee also will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate.xij

u݂edc{ĂۗL،̏ҍē͈ێ܂B܂Aψ͂edcۗL،̊z₻̍\ɂāAKv΂̒s܂BvƂ̂͑OƓ\ɂȂĂ܂B

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wThe Committee discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. It will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared to employ these tools as appropriate.xij

wThe Committee will monitor the economic outlook and financial developments and will act as needed to best foster maximum employment and price stability.xiOj

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wVoting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Charles L. Evans; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Janet L. Yellen.

Voting against the action were: Richard W. Fisher, Narayana Kocherlakota, and Charles I. Plosser, who would have preferred to continue to describe economic conditions as likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period.xij

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wThe Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.xi̎ԎČfj

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Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB,
Vitor Constancio, Vice-President of the ECB,
Frankfurt am Main, 4 August 2011

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr110807.en.html
PRESS RELEASE
7 August 2011 - Statement by the President of the ECB

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wAt the same time, it will very significantly increase the supply of liquidity to the Swiss franc money market over the next few days. It intends to expand banksf sight deposits at the SNB from currently around CHF 30 billion to CHF 80 billion.x

wConsequently, with immediate effect, the SNB will no longer renew repos and SNB Bills that fall due and will repurchase outstanding SNB Bills, until the desired level of sight deposits has been reached.x

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wSince the SNBfs last quarterly monetary policy assessment, the global economic outlook has worsened. At the same time the appreciation of the Swiss franc has accelerated sharply during the last few weeks. Consequently, the outlook for the Swiss economy has deteriorated substantially.x

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wThe SNB is keeping a close watch on developments on the foreign exchange market and will take further measures against the strength of the Swiss franc if necessary.x

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E܂ƂAłȂ

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El^ɂmꂳ̋L֘A

what_a_dudȅłƂcbR~܂̂łЉB

http://d.hatena.ne.jp/what_a_dude/20110801/p1
2011-08-01
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http://d.hatena.ne.jp/what_a_dude/20110802/p1
2011-08-02
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܂͍̎̃R[i[i|[[̕Ɋւul^j̑Ȃ̂łB

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/presentation110627.pdf

Ỹghǂ

XCĥQWy[WwProductivity trend largely undiminished (yet!)xiŏ̂ƂČfˁjB

wThe other big 1970s mistake was trying to keep growth up at an unsustainable level - arguably because a productivity growth slowdown went unrecognized (Orphanides (1994) and others)

When there is an economic downturn, how much is a shock to trend?
Lots of talk about output gap, but trend both matters more and is more measurable (Kuttner and Posen (2001, 2004))

An apparent puzzle in the UK right now:
The numbers on UK productivity of late are pretty bad looking
Firms are hiring workers and in surveys citing capacity constraints
Should this lead us to revise down our estimate of trend growth?x

VbNɂ闎݂̌̃ghǂȂ邩dvƂbȂ̂łAÛandcv|ŋc_ɂȂĂuVbNɂė񂾐YX񕜂Ȃ͉̂ł˂viVTɃl^ɂ܂Apł͌oς̗]萶Y͂kiY͂̊p󋵂PĂ̂łjĂAٗp\zȏɊg債Ă钆ŐY̐LтȂ߁AvŽʂƂāuYvア܂܂ŐڂĂ鎖ɂȂĂ̂svcł܂ȂƂ[błȁjƂ__܂Ał̉poςɂusvcȏ󋵁vwEĂ܂B

܂AƂ͐Y͂̊p󋵂PĂ鎖wiƂ悤ȓiٗpg債AT[xCf[^ɂƐY͂̐ɑ΂wEsĂjsĂ钆ŁAỶP͌ȂƂ󋵂ŁAƂȂ̂͂̐Y̐LтɊւČʂׂȂ̂ǂƂbĂ̂łÃXChɂ̓B

wNO, we should continue to treat UK trend growth as largely unchanged There are good reasons to doubt the observed productivity data:

Companies with low margins are hiring labour and increasing hours- counted data that we can believe in, and that cannot be easily reconciled with belief in declining labour productivity

The UK economy has shown great adaptability and limited evidence of sectoral or labour market mismatch to date

Direct measures of the way that supply shocks are usually felt - corporate liquidations, investment shortfall, long-term unemployment - have not yet accumulated to very much impact

There is no comparable international etechnology shockf

GDP data tends to get revised up after recessions (particularly in UK) and there is an obvious candidate in Net Export measures

If there remain overemployed sectors, then productivity will risex

܂vɌ_͐YɊւĂ͂ꂩLтł傤ƂbɂȂĂ̂łAtɌ΃|[[ψ̎咣uVON̂悤ȏ󋵂ɂ͂ȂȂvƂ̂̃|Cgiڂ̃|Cg͍pŏ̕ɂuZɂăCt҂AJ[ĂvƂbˁjƂȂ̂łǂAĂ͂ǂȂ邩iƌĂYƂTO͊ef[^ԐړIɌv̂łtŔbȂ̂ł킩ɂ͎ɂî悤ȋC邪܂LjViCjƂłɂB

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ŌɂŃ|[[ψ͂ႯĂ̂킢[

[ƂŎŌ̃XChiŌ͂܂Ƃ߁jƂȂ܂QVڂ̃XChɂȂ܂ẤwAvoiding historical mistakes (so far)xƂ̂ł܂āAŏ̏炢Ȃ萁̂łAHB

wIndependent central banks have a tendency to err on the preemptive deterrent side, not to be too softx

uƗsv͂̍slāuɘavł͂ȂuvGeBuȈ߁vɕ΂₷X܂iدjB

Ƃ̔]œ{ϊĂ݂܂ǂǂł(^^)B

wBIS just said all central banks should raise rates, and pointed to the UKfs above target past inflation - NONSENSEx

SĂ̒͗グׂłAp̓CtiĂ邶˂ȂǂƌBISɑ΂ĂĂ߂傫Ȃb역߂ɓ˂ŔȂ₪Rm[Ƃ͋ł͂܂(^^)Av啶ŁuNONSENSEvƋłA܂͊mɂV炢ӂł(^^)B

wSome central banks, particularly in EMs pegged to the US dollar, should raise rates as their conditions demand

In the UK and the west more broadly, there is little or no credit growth, little wage growth beyond productivity, little evidence of rising inflation expectations, and oil prices are not (yet) a one way bet

Every MPC meeting, I sit opposite the huge portrait of Montagu Norman, and ask myself gWhat Would Montagu Do?h and do the opposite. So should other central bankers.x

[ƂŁiŌ̃XChɂ̂łj|[[ψ͂PXRON̋Qɓ郊XNӎĂ悤ŁAȂƂł̏o͘_OƂɗĂiǉɘaĂĂ̂ł瓖Ołj悤ŁBƁAŏoĂMontagu NormanƂ̂͂Ă̂and̖ق̂悤łs׋ŏڂ͑܂ioWbǵuo[hXv𔼕炢ǂŐϓǏԂorzĵwikipediałtĂ܂傤B

Montagu Norman
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montagu_Norman,_1st_Baron_Norman

[Ƃł܂Ƃ߂łA_́uVON̂悤ȃX^Ot[V͋NȂł傤vł

wWe are in an economic situation in the UK today where:

Monetary policy anchors inflation expectations
Workers have limited bargaining power over wages
Oil prices are not obviously accelerating one way
Trend productivity growth is largely undiminished

Therefore little risk of inflation let alone stagflation

But we still risk echoing that 30fs show writ smallx

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andcv|l^肾ƎԐ؂ɂȂ肻Ȃ̂łƂ肠

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http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2011/mpc1107.pdf

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wThe immediate policy decisionx̑QUpOtB

w26 Most members judged that it was appropriate to maintain the current stance of monetary policy at this meeting.x

Z͌ێB

wIt was likely that the current weakness in activity would persist for longer than previously thought, although the reduction over the month in the exchange rate and in market interest rates would provide some countervailing stimulus to the economy.x

̌oϊ̓݉͂lobOɑz肵ĂアAÕ|hsł̋ቺoςւ̎hƂȂł傤B

wThat weakness, together with the continued subdued behaviour of earnings, reinforced the case that inflation was likely to fall back once the temporary impact of the factors pushing up on it had waned.x

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wBut there also remained upside risks associated with the sustained period of above-target inflation. There was a range of views on the balance of these downside and upside risks. Overall, however, recent developments had reduced the likelihood that a tightening in policy would be warranted in the near term.x

ƂƂŁAŌ̏Ɂuŋ߂̌oϏ󋵂͋߂̋Z߂̕KvĂvƂb܂ăL^RƂłȁB

ꂩ珇ԋtł܂񂪁AQTpOt̓ɂ͂ȎB

w25 Overall, the balance between the upside and the downside risks to inflation in the medium term had not changed sufficiently over the month for Committee members to change their views of the appropriate setting for monetary policy. The risks to inflation in the medium term remained substantial in both directions.x

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wNot Thate70fs Show Why Stagflation is Unlikelyx

Ƃ̂ł܂āA̍\łB

w1. What kind of world are we in today?
2. Monetary policy that anchors inflation expectations
3. Labor markets with limited bargaining power for workers over wages
4. Oil price trends not obviously accelerating upwards (yet?)
5. Productivity trend largely undiminished (yet!)
6. Avoiding historical mistakes (so far)x

ƂƂŁAF̘b̌Ał͂ꂩCt͍i܂񂵁AX^Ot[VɂȂ܂łiƂʂ|[[͂lobŗʓIɘag̒PƒĂ𖈉sĂ̂łj[wiɂĐĂ܂BŁA̘__̃w^N\iԈӖjƁA

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XCĥSy[WƂTy[WɉӏiXChV[ӏȂ̂łjłȎB

w For foreign policy , the question facing an intervention decision is whether this is Munich (deter) or Vietnam (accommodate)?

For monetary policy, the question is similar but reversed: is this the 1930s (accommodate) or 1970s (deter)?

The underlying dynamic today is parallel to the 1930s, but we have avoided repeating that for several reasons:

- Structural changes (automatic stabilizers, flexible x/r, deposit insurance)
- A smaller share of the world in synchronized contraction
- Aggressive coordinated macroeconomic stimulus 2008]2010

Is there a risk to go from such a state to one of overheating and inflation - or inflation and contraction (aka stagflation)? x

ƂƂŁA|[[ψ̌ĂƂĂ͌͂VOÑCtƂ͂RON̋QƂ̔rŌĂ悤ŁA܂RON̋Q̂悤ȏԂɂȂĂȂ̂͊e̗Ri\v̋ZɘâƂĂ܂ȁjɂ̂łAƂbĂ܂B܂莟̃y[WɂȂ܂B

w Letfs assess what it took for stagflation to occur in the 1970s

This is a serious question, not a straw man
- Stagflation is unusual historically, especially following a recession
- The historical and theoretical imagery of epre]emptive monetary policyfstems completely from the 1970s experience

What would be involved in repeating the wage]price spirals?
- Unanchored inflation expectations
- Transmission of expectations into real wage resistance
- Economically significant energy supply shock(s)
- An unrecognized decline in trend productivity growth

Only the third of these (oil) seems to possibly be at work
- Bruno and Sachs (1985), Blanchard and Gali (2007) show that all of them have to interact to (re)produce the 1970sx

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XCĥUڂwMonetary policy that anchors inflation expectationsxƂB

w The theoretical literature on central banking (and some press) treats monetary policymaking as under constant suspicion

The empirical evidence has not supported this view (Blinder,McCallum, Posen on CBI; Kuttner and Posen on CB governors)

Right now in global markets, there is understanding of explanations
- Recent Inflation Report and my February speech on financial expectations

Several factors contribute to this real]world anchoring:
- Central bank independence from fiscal authorities
- Better knowledge of how some (not all) of the economy works
- Inflation targeting and transparent disclosure by central banks

A reasonable discourse and accountability, not a etrigger]strategyfgame of needing to pre]empt (fighting the last war?)x

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ǂǁ[ƔŃXCĥPWڂ́wLabor markets with limited bargaining power for workers over wagesxƂB

wEveryone in the UK should remember (or know) about the 1970s, the Winter
of Discontent, Britain Against Itself (Beer (1982))c
- That was in part the result of 30 years of rising union power

But that was then, this is now
Today, we are seeing the result of 30 years of declining union power

Labour market structures have changed in the UK and globally
- Liberalization and other policies from Thatcher and Blair
- Pressures from globalization of production and global labour force
- Changes in the technology and specialization of work

I am NOT saying one state is better or worse normatively
I am saying that as a policymaker, one has to recognize realityx

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wOil price trends not obviously accelerating upwards (yet?)xƂB

wOil matters for modern economies, but less than it did 30 years ago
Is there a major supply shock, or an exaggerated response to one given high demand?
What is the elasticity of demand by consumers and businesses?
How fast would/could there be a supply response to demand?

Deciding the importance of the trend in energy prices depends on:
The size of the trend and the goodfs importance in the basket The size of the underlying trend versus the fluctuations around trend

IF the trend is big enough and reversals short]enough, we will respond to keep inflation in line with the target (Bean (2011))

But, a majority of the MPC (and I agree) says not yet therex

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wThe other big 1970s mistake was trying to keep growth up at an unsustainable level - arguably because a productivity growth slowdown went unrecognized (Orphanides (1994) and others)x

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