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andcv|XWX͂B
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2010/mpc1009.pdf

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http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2010/mpc1008.pdf

ɂXMinutel^ɂ̂ňȉp͒f肪Ȃ΂XMinutełB

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QRpOtȍ~́wThe immediate policy decisionxȉ̏܂͍ŏɓǂޖłAWɂ͊ƃTTƗĂCtɊւ镔ȂoĂł̊iȂ݂ɁuInflation, Inflation, InflationvẴXs[XQQSpencer Dale񂩂oĂ̂łg͂܂ǂłȂjB

wThe Committee reviewed how the key risks to the medium-term outlook for inflation had changed over the month.x

Ȃ݂ɂW̓CtɊւāuT̃Ct|[gꎞIɏ㏸vƂ]Ă܂AȂɒXy[XĂ킯ł͂ȂB

wThe first key risk was that the prolonged period of above-target inflation would lead inflation expectations to drift up, making it more costly to bring inflation back to target.x

̃CtԂp邱ƂɂăCt҂܂Ă܂XNł܂ȁB

wThe second key risk was that private demand would not grow sufficiently quickly to replace the waning boost from the working out of the stock cycle and public spending, thus increasing the margin of spare capacity in the economy and causing inflation to fall materially below the target in the medium term.x

Ԏvւ̃og^boɁAY̗͂]肪CtĂ܂XNƂ̃XNłȁB

ŁÃXNɑ΂]łAŏ̃XNɊւẮu^̐Lт}ĂvuT[xCȂǂɂƈʂ̃Ct҂͈肵ĂvƂƂŁAûPŃXNɕω͖vƂ_ɂȂĂ܂ȁBQSpOtłB

wIn relation to the first risk, CPI inflation had remained unchanged at 3.1% during August, although pay growth measures had remained subdued. Most indicators of inflation expectations were broadly unchanged. Overall, the Committee judged that the upside risk to inflation expectations, and so the inflation outlook, remained but had not changed materially over the month.x

ŁAQԖڂ̂ق̃XNɊւĂ͔N㔼̖Ԏv̌ʂ͊T˃oXĂƂb̂悤łȁBƂƂőQTpOtB

wWith regard to the second risk, developments over the month were on balance consistent with a reduction in growth prospects for the second half of 2010. In the latest vintage of ONS data, private sector final demand had been broadly flat during the first half of the year as a whole. Instead, growth had been accounted for by contributions from stockbuilding and public expenditure, both of which would fall back in due course. Some indicators also suggested that service sector output growth could weaken during the second half of the year. There had, however, been more promising information about the strength of consumption in the third quarter.x

ƂƂŌ_̓XN̓oXƌȂ̂łA񂶂ႠłȘbȂoĂ邩Ƃ}XgAɊւψ̌ɊYPXpOt̏ɂȂ̂łB

wNear-term prospects for inflation remained unusually uncertain and sensitive to the impact of a number of factors whose impact was difficult to evaluate accurately.x

unusually uncertainĂǂŕ䎌ł(^^)A̗v͂̌ɏĂ܂ǂAVAT̈グƂAȉ㏸ƂA܂ł̃|h̉eƂGlM[ỉeƂׂĂ܂BȂ݂ɂWlobcv|ł܂̕ӂɊւĂ͂łȂłȂƂb܂āB

wThe Committee could not be sure of the extent to which inflation would moderate. Businessesfcosts and prices depended on the degree of spare capacity, both within companies and in the labour market, and therefore in part on the strength of demand.xi͂Wlobcv|QWpOtj

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ŁAQVpOtłAEIȋቺɊւČyi͍ŏ̋̕Zs̏󋵂Ɋւψ̌łłȂłȂƂbĂ܂ABč̐yуCt̉ɂ̂ƁA̐pX̉VtgƂbĂ܂jĂ܂āA܂Aŉp̋Z@ւ̃t@fBO󋵂PĂ鎖ApɂNWbgs̉PɌqƂuقف[vȎwEB

wInternational short and medium-term interest rates had declined substantially over the month. Those falls, insofar as they had reflected revised views about the future course of monetary policy, would be likely to stimulate activity at home and overseas. Moreover, the external financing raised by UK banks during August, and over the year as a whole, would contribute to the necessary restructuring of their balance sheets. That restructuring, which would take a long time to complete, was a pre-condition for an eventual normalisation in credit conditions.x

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wCommittee members differed in their interpretation of these developments for the balance of risks to activity and so inflation in the medium term.x

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wA number of members thought there had been either a slight reduction or little change to this risk, with weaker news about the prospects for activity during 2010 H2 and the boost from lower market interest rates acting in opposite directions.x

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ŁAb߂đ̃o[i琔lHj͉XNgƂȁB

wOther members thought that recent developments indicated that the headwinds to a recovery in private sector demand in the United Kingdom and overseas were somewhat stronger than previously thought, and that the downside risks to activity had increased.x

܂ɂ̂̂P͂̉XN݉ǖʂɂđ̐Y̔o郊XNwEƁB

wOne member was also concerned that the risk of an adverse hit to the supply capacity of the economy had increased in recent months. That would occur if a decline in growth during the second half of the year prompted companies, which had been holding on to underutilised resources in anticipation of a faster recovery in activity, to shed more labour and scrap more capital.x

̋Z̃ANVɊ֘A镔ǂǂނ̂ăGCl

ƂƂŁACt̃XN͏㉺Ƃbiłڐ͏̕Iɂ肻ȃXNiVATグƂii㏸Ƃ|h̉eƂĂbłˁjŁAY]肪Ct}Ă̂͑O炸[ƘbĂđSRȂȂƂCłjȂ̂łAŏLɂ悤ɌiCɊւĂ͉UꃊXN̕Ă銴ɂȂĂ܂QXpOť_ɓȂ̂ŉpƃZgoLOӂȖ{ΒL搶ĉ܂i}XłłjB

wOn balance, most members thought that the current level of Bank Rate and stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves remained appropriate to balance the risks to the inflation outlook in the medium term.x

ƂƂŋZ͌ێiPiAndrew Sentancej̂悤ɔ΂Ă܂jƂbŖwǂ̃o[vĂ̂łB

wBut both key risks were substantial, and these members stood ready to respond in either direction as the balance of risks evolved.x

㉺̃XN͂Ȃ傫ÃXN݉ꍇɂ͓K؂ȍsǂ̕ɂƂKvƂbłȁB

wFor some of those members, the probability that further action would become necessary to stimulate the economy and keep inflation on track to hit the target in the medium term had increased.x

ƂƂŁAψ̒ł́u̐ANV͌iChCt𒆊IɃ^[QbgɎĂKv\܂ĂvƂƂǂ߂̂łAẮukeep inflation on track to hit the target in the medium termvďA܂ł̋c_̗ƁAuiChȂ畨㏸͗}Ƃ􂪕KvɂȂĂĂvƂɂIɂ͓ǂ߂Ă܂̂łAȊpȐƂƂȂƂ܂ςȂƂv̂łA͖{͂ǂ󂹂΂悢̂ăGClII

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ZsɊւ錟̑UpOtɖʔwEB

wThe Committee noted that asset price movements remained more highly correlated than usual, suggesting that market participants viewed individual asset returns as remaining unusually dependent upon global economic developments.x

YiʏւĂāA͌ʎỶiEIȌoς̏󋵂ɒʏe₷ƂsQ҂̌߂Ă鎖ƂȁB

wThis heightened correlation had been associated with an increased incidence of short-lived, generalised asset price rallies and declines. The transitory nature of some of these changes provided grounds for being cautious about drawing firm signals from monthly financial market developments.x

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wIt remained unusually difficult to identify trends in nominal demand from the latest monetary aggregates, given higher-than-normal uncertainty about the seasonal pattern of some financial companiesf money holdings. Household money balances had continued to grow slowly, although there had been some pickup in the growth of private non-financial companiesf money balances.x

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http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100921a.htm

O񐺖
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100810a.htm

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iCf͎͂قƂǕς炸AƓs኱ċsݏo኱グ

wInformation received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that the pace of recovery in output and employment has slowed in recent months. Household spending is increasing gradually, but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit.xij

ƌƂ͑OƓB̊Ɠs኱fB

wBusiness spending on equipment and software is rising, though less rapidly than earlier in the year, while investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak. Employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls.xij

wBusiness spending on equipment and software is rising; however, investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak and employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. xiOj

ݔƃ\tgEFAւ̓g債ĂƂ̌󔻒f኱Ă܂ȁBƓs̑̕ɂ͕ωB

wHousing starts are at a depressed level. xij

͑OƓB

wBank lending has continued to contract, but at a reduced rate in recent months. xij
wBank lending has continued to contract. xiOj

sݏo̔f͈グĂ܂B

wThe Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability, although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be modest in the near term.xij

wNonetheless, the Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability, although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be more modest in the near term than had been anticipated.xiOj

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ɊւQpOtłāA̕Ėxx悤ȘbĂ̂ɍςƂ̂̓|CgƎv̂ǂˁB

wMeasures of underlying inflation are currently at levels somewhat below those the Committee judges most consistent, over the longer run, with its mandate to promote maximum employment and price stability. xij

ucurrently at levels somewhat belowvL^[[[[iÉEjƁB

wWith substantial resource slack continuing to restrain cost pressures and longer-term inflation expectations stable, inflation is likely to remain subdued for some time before rising to levels the Committee considers consistent with its mandate.xij

ƂƂŁAubefore rising to levels the Committee considers consistent with its mandatevĕƕ͂̃jAXɂȂĈłǂAāuKƍl鐅֕㏸߂܂ł̊ԏXԂ|܂vƂƂbɂȂ̂ȁB܂sɊւĂ͂܂uftOv݂Șbɂ͈ꉞȂĂȂǂAjAX̓jAXƂĕOƂɂȂł傤˂B

Ô͂ȊłB

wMeasures of underlying inflation have trended lower in recent quarters and, with substantial resource slack continuing to restrain cost pressures and longer-term inflation expectations stable, inflation is likely to be subdued for some time. xiOj

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edcۗ̕L،̊zǂ̂̂Ƃ̂܂ł

RpOtǂłāuӁ[vƂB

wThe Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period. xij

Ƃ̂͑OƓƂ񓯂ƌ(^^)B

wThe Committee also will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings.xij

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wThe Committee will continue to monitor the economic outlook and financial developments and is prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery and to return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with its mandate. xij

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wVoting against the policy was Thomas M. Hoenig, who judged that the economy continues to recover at a moderate pace. xij
wVoting against the policy was Thomas M. Hoenig, who judges that the economy is recovering modestly, as projected. xiOj

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wAccordingly, he believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted and will lead to future imbalances that undermine stable long-run growth. xij

wAccordingly, he believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted and limits the Committee's ability to adjust policy when needed. xiOj

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wIn addition, given economic and financial conditions, Mr. Hoenig did not believe that continuing to reinvest principal payments from its securities holdings was required to support the Committeefs policy objectives.xij

wIn addition, given economic and financial conditions, Mr. Hoenig did not believe that keeping constant the size of the Federal Reserve's holdings of longer-term securities at their current level was required to support a return to the Committee's policy objectives. xiOj

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http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90900001&sid=aHOgyzAHjzuA
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http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=jp09_newsarchive&sid=aXsd5nx.CV8A
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http://www.boj.or.jp/type/press/koen07/data/ko1009c.pdf

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http://www.boj.or.jp/type/press/danwa/dan1009b.htm

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http://jp.reuters.com/article/treasuryNews/idJPnTK043963520100915
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wThe logic of the portfolio balance channel implies that the degree of accommodation delivered by the Federal Reservefs securities purchase program is determined primarily by the quantity and mix of securities the central bank holds or is anticipated to hold at a point in time (the gstock viewh), rather than by the current pace of new purchases (the gflow viewh).x

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wIn support of the stock view, the cessation of the Federal Reservefs purchases of agency securities at the end of the first quarter of this year seems to have had only negligible effects on longer-term rates and spreads.x

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wThe Federal Reserve did not hold the size of its securities portfolio precisely constant after it ended its agency purchase program earlier this year. Instead, consistent with the Committeefs goal of ultimately returning the portfolio to one consisting primarily of Treasury securities, we adopted a policy of re-investing maturing Treasuries in similar securities while allowing agency securities to run off as payments of principal were received.x

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wTo date, we have realized about $140 billion of repayments of principal on our holdings of agency debt and MBS, most of it prior to the end of the purchase program. Continued repayments at this pace, together with the policy of not re-investing the proceeds, were expected to lead to a slight reduction in policy accommodation over time.x ŁuۗLlaȑ҂͋ZɘaԂ̎኱̒ቺɌqƗ\zvƂbĂ̂XgbNr[ɊÂ̂ł͂ȂƂ̂̎ɏoĂ闝B wHowever, more recently, as the pace of economic growth has slowed somewhat, longer-term interest rates have fallen and mortgage refinancing activity has picked up. Increased refinancing has in turn led the Fedfs holding of agency MBS to run off more quickly than previously anticipated. Although mortgage prepayment rates are difficult to predict, under the assumption that mortgage rates remain near current levels, we estimated that an additional$400 billion or so of MBS and agency debt currently in the Fedfs portfolio could be repaid by the end of 2011.x

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wAt their most recent meeting, FOMC participants observed that allowing the Federal Reservefs balance sheet to shrink in this way at a time when the outlook had weakened somewhat was inconsistent with the Committeefs intention to provide the monetary accommodation necessary to support the recovery.x

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wMoreover, a bad dynamic could come into at play: Any further weakening of the economy that resulted in lower longer-term interest rates and a still-faster pace of mortgage refinancing would likely lead in turn to an even more-rapid runoff of MBS from the Fedfs balance sheet. Thus, a weakening of the economy might act indirectly to increase the pace of passive policy tightening--a perverse outcome.x

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wIn response to these concerns, the FOMC agreed to stabilize the quantity of securities held by the Federal Reserve by re-investing payments of principal on agency securities into longer-term Treasury securities.x

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wIn response to these concerns, the FOMC agreed to stabilize the quantity of securities held by the Federal Reserve by re-investing payments of principal on agency securities into longer-term Treasury securities.x

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wWe decided to reinvest in Treasury securities rather than agency securities because the Federal Reserve already owns a very large share of available agency securities, suggesting that reinvestment in Treasury securities might be more effective in reducing longer-term interest rates and improving financial conditions with less chance of adverse effects on market functioning.x

wAlso, as I already noted, reinvestment in Treasury securities is more consistent with the Committeefs longer-term objective of a portfolio made up principally of Treasury securities. We do not rule out changing the reinvestment strategy if circumstances warrant, however.x

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wBy agreeing to keep constant the size of the Federal Reservefs securities portfolio, the Committee avoided an undesirable passive tightening of policy that might otherwise have occurred. The decision also underscored the Committeefs intent to maintain accommodative financial conditions as needed to support the recovery. We will continue to monitor economic developments closely and to evaluate whether additional monetary easing would be beneficial.x

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wIn particular, the Committee is prepared to provide additional monetary accommodation through unconventional measures if it proves necessary, especially if the outlook were to deteriorate significantly. The issue at this stage is not whether we have the tools to help support economic activity and guard against disinflation. We do. As I will discuss next, the issue is instead whether, at any given juncture, the benefits of each tool, in terms of additional stimulus, outweigh the associated costs or risks of using the tool.x

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wNotably, since December 2008, the FOMC has held its target for the federal funds rate in a range of 0 to 25 basis points. Moreover, since March 2009, the Committee has consistently stated its expectation that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low policy rates for an extended period. Partially in response to FOMC communications, futures markets quotes suggest that investors are not anticipating significant policy tightening by the Federal Reserve for quite some time. Market expectations for continued accommodative policy have in turn helped reduce interest rates on a range of short- and medium-term financial instruments to quite low levels, indeed not far above the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates in many cases.x

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wThe FOMC has also acted to improve market functioning and to push longer-term interest rates lower through its large-scale purchases of agency debt, agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and longer-term Treasury securities, of which the Federal Reserve currently holds more than $2 trillion.x ܂mɔ̃AiEXƂɂeqáuZPׂɁvƂœUꂽ̂łǂA̐S̒̓AiEX_10N2.5܂Œቺ̂́Ǎ4߂܂ŏ㏸b͊SX[łłB wThe channels through which the Fedfs purchases affect longer-term interest rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject to debate.x ܂炻ȁBŁAo[iL搶͂̂悤ɋłB wI see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel, which holds that once short-term interest rates have reached zero, the Federal Reservefs purchases of longer-term securities affect financial conditions by changing the quantity and mix of financial assets held by the public.x [ɂedc̎YɂāAԋZ@ւ̎Yw悤ɂȂAƂ|[gtHIoXʂ̃lĂ̂łǂAu[ɂ|[gtHIoXʁvĂ͔̂P̂ł͌ʂ͂Ȃ񂶂ȂƎvioXV[g񂪂烊oX͋NȂł傤Aɒl̂ȂΓł傤jłāAĂĂ̓łȎႪCłB wSpecifically, the Fedfs strategy relies on the presumption that different financial assets are not perfect substitutes in investorsf portfolios, so that changes in the net supply of an asset available to investors affect its yield and those of broadly similar assets.x [A͉̐ƎvB wThus, our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely both reduced the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into holding other assets with similar characteristics, such as credit risk and duration.x Y̌㒷̂̂͏㏸ƂؗɃX[Ă̂ƂB wFor example, some investors who sold MBS to the Fed may have replaced them in their portfolios with longer-term, high-quality corporate bonds, depressing the yields on those assets as well.x ƂŁAuvu|[gtHIoXʁvƂbY̌ʂƂĂĂ̂łAĂƂǂł͂ȂCLۂ܂AXɐ\グ܂ƁA̍zƂbɂȂꍇɁAułȏʂ̂ˁvi̍ułłAenlbcv|ɂ̂łARONlar͗jIȒᐅɂƂFjƂAu|[gtHIoXȏN̂ˁvƂ__ɗꍇɁA̑zs_IȕKRɖR悤ȋCłˁB ƂƂŁA̕ӂƂ̂enlbcv|݂ĂƁAeqa̍gČ\n[h񂶂Ȃ́io[iL͒KȂ̂ŋ}ɏ]̃WbNĔs\͂邪jƂ͒v܂łA͂B ܂邩Ȃ(^^) gbvɖ߂ QOPO^OX^OW ŁAT[rXt[Ŷ͗ǂ̂łEEEEE ʂoɂ́uӁvŃX[Ă̂łA悭悭΃T[rXt[Y܂ƂƂŁAtbVŁwǉZɘả\xiʐM̃tbVu[o[OzMpjƂ̂oӂ肩烆[~悪߂ĂA敨Ƃ߂Ă݂AOꂤ񂱏Ԃ][iTNWXȂĐ敨O䍂̂ɂTÃIt@[ƂiW\ԁjAĂƂ[ŁAꉞʂɌhӂ\悤ȋCłȂƂB Pɒ̊OꏄĐΐIɂODSڋ߂̂TN͔Ƃł͂ȂƂcbR~͂Ȃ悤(^^) ĂȖŁAśiʓIɂ́jʂɌhӂ\悤ȓĂ̂łA܊px_[u₪ǉɘavƕ񂶂ĂƂ̂ɁAב֎sł͑SR~ɐUꂸAƂ~ɂȂĂ܂āA͂Ȃ鎖Ƃ[łÃ[XgXeXg̃CLǂ̂̂Ƃb烆[Ă݂AčĂ݂Ƃ܂āAב֎sꂿ͂̕ɔĂƂȖłȁB lƍ̂RONDȂĈב֓Iɂ͂ǂł񂶂Ȃ̂Ǝv̂łA{͍̕ޗɂȂł匋ǁEEEEE ܂͉~Ȃ̂̃T[rXt[YȂĕč胆[ww肵ĂvȂ̂ƂCv肷̂ł(^^)A܂܂͂ƒv܂āAŐ܊pT[rXt[YꂽƂ̂Ɋ̐S̈ב֎sꂪP~ȂƂ͎cOƂ\グ悤܂łȂB 傤ǃ[肪l^ɂȂĂ܂~isƂ܂̏o悤ȊԂ̈ɍXȂcOôł܂AiiB b͈Ⴂ܂₱Ȃ̂B http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90900001&sid=anDz1LxIgKx0 EC]cF򎁂͢Ɍ|C^r[iUpdate2j w򎁂̖}\ɂȂƂ̊ϑނ̂󂯂ĂV̍͔Bx EEEE₠l^ƂĂ͖ʔłǂA܂܂SRł܂ĂȂł傤Aɐ񂪏Ă]̍ČHڍ郊XN͂Ǝv̂łǂ˂i΁jB ̑֘AGk EKւ͉̓ [ƂŃT[rXt[YôłAŃT[rXt[YɂĎ₳ꂽ쑍ق́uKvƔfꍇɂ́AKEK؂ɐΉsĂjłBȏłȉłȂvƔ悤Łix_[Ō肵܂Ã[Teł̕fĂ܂jāA܊pT[rXt[YĂ񂾂ƈА̗ǂ̌イ̂邾낤ɂƎvB ܂xxrɏôȂłǂAKɃT[rXJԂĂȂ񂿂Ċɘag𑱂A܂Ȃ͏ȂƂrƔrƁA܂{l̃LN^[dȂłǂAƍHvł񂩂ȂƎv̂ł܂łA͂B EŁAǉɘȁĂǂȂ̂ ČfłB w{śAšoρE𒍈Ӑ[_ŁAKvƔfꍇɂ́AKEK؂ɐΉsĂjłBx Ȃ݂ɉpłł͂łB wThe Bank will carefully examine the outlook for economic activity and prices, and, if judged necessary, take policy actions in a timely and appropriate manner.x ӂނӂށAƂł́uKvƔfꍇvłAgK[Ȃ̂ƂGkĂłA̔f̕łǁufwxvƂ󓮑ԁip󓮑ԁjȂ̂łAƂ͒Nfē₪Ɉ񂾂IIIƂ^bɂȂ܂āAႠNf̂ƂƎsȂ̂Ȃ̂Ƃł傤(^^)B EEEƂł͂ȂāAۂ͂̎󓮑ԕ\͂\ɂȂĂ܂Aʂɓ₾̌t@Ȃł̂Ō̖悤ɐ\܂(^^)B E͒X 搶̖܋Êw̍ŐVłʂēǂ݉\B http://news.fbc.keio.ac.jp/~kenjoh/work/korunakare328.pdf EEEE傤ǖڂ̑ǑŁu͂łvƗ͐gLuTOAWOƂłvƂĂ܂āA̍Ԏ̘bɑ΂āu]TłvƂRȂɂĂ̂łA܂Ɂu{ɂ͑ΊO񂠂łvufՎx͍ȂłvƂonBĖԂ̎YȂ񂷂ǁB ƎRȂɂɒu܂ẮAŏIIɂ͖ԎYSpč悤ƂĂłˁIIIIۼ x͍̃oXV[gɊւăOXƃlbg̘bႲɂĐĂ邵A̎RȂɂƂ̂͋炩蒼قX̂ł͂ȂƎv̂łAȂ̂^}̕\Ȃł˂EEEEEƂقق̂فB gbvɖ߂ QOPO^OX^OV usGkƒl^Łi܂܂WN\z[jv [TȇLX^[APɌ킳Ă邾Ǝv̂łǂAבւ̃Re[^[Ɍāu͓̐􌈒łύX͂ł傤HHvƎ₵̂Œ琷ɐĂ܂܂Bm[gobɐ͋֕Ȃ̂ŒӁ b͈ႤuJ[哱v݂AǑfleLg[Ɉ~񂵂}ľu哱v̌ʂVԖ̃eC^NȂ񂶂l[mƎv̂łAȂɊ̌Ȃł˂EEEEE m񂪒RPƂȁisꃁƂlY^j ̍sꂿłAٗpv\z舫ȂiƌĂe͈Ǝv̂łj󂯂č̉emłA܂敨ROK炢キĂłAƒ璆アƂfGȓWJB アƂ[̂͂[ɓƂ̔肪oĂłāAhJƔ肪oƌ΂ƑԓIɂ͂̕ӂ̂Ƃ[Ƃł܂̂ŁAlȂ͔̂lȂƂ[܂񂯂ǂAGNX|[W[𗎂ƂɐĂƂAvôɂ̃][ƂA܂̎̂Ƃ̎IȎcOWJł܂āAɍ΂ɁB łĒƂ͊Ɗm肵Ă܂iǎIՂɂ͂ԃRPČقǋ͂ȂȂĵŁA܂PDW㔼ɂȂĂ邴񂵂Ƃ̂ƁAɔ̐l̂ȂėiȂA肷Ă܂āuƔpôŔȂvƂԂȂ̉\͂܂^^ĵł傤ȂƂ͎vłāẢ͒][Ɛ敨Ă悤ŉȂƂŁB TNJgODR㔼ɂȂĂĂQNJgODPTɐڋ߂Ă܂ƂƂȂ̂łAĂȔI荠ƂV̓ӂ̐ŁAǉɘaƂ悤Șb͂ς薳ǂԎ͌ĂƂ悤ȏ󋵂Ǝv܂̂ŁAl܂ƐԂ߂łA܂ŋ}ɋZ􂾂̊Oɕω̂Ǝv܂ƔȋC͂łǂˁB܂܂ł̏グ߂ƌ΂܂łȂłǂAʂɐe̓Ĝ悤ɔȂĂƂ́B ƂłȁAƂ̂̂ł傤A҂̂TNWXƂTNXỎivXɂȂĂ܂āAN[|̂WX񂪂XOΔňlx[XłPDTъÂiT̈͂PуXvbhjȂĂ܂āiۂ͂ƍƎvjAWX͉voZm܂񂪔肪ołXO̓Aẑ悤ɔlāA܂XNC[YƂƂ񂩂ȂƎɌꂵɁBSȂƂƂłAĂ鑊ŊOƂɂȂƉvoȂV̔Ƃ[̂ڗƂx̓ɂȂĐɈ⊶ł܂B ܂łȁAb͂܂ǂAtFCs̒蒅ɌāiȂ̂ǂYꂽj[WƂłA[[ǂĂӐ}Iɔ߂ĂƂvȂsׁi܂̒N߂ĂƒfĂ܂̂ŔÖ^^jɊւĂƂȂ̂˂Ǝv܂ǂ˂BsʎQ҂ėʎsɑ΂Ǝvłǂ˂EEEE Xło[iL̒ǉɘaIvVɊւl@iWN\z[uj XT̃l^ł܂B http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100827a.pdf iT̋jjɒY̒ǉɊւĂ̍l@p܂Apenlbcv|ɂ܂悤ɁA̒YɊւĂ̓}l^[̌ʂ̘bĂ̘̂bĂ̂̐ŁAǂbĂ鏊uvvƂȂ̂ł񂵂A̐IvVɊւĂ͊{IɃ_oĂ̂ŁÃ_oRTTƓǂŌ܂B EKC_X̕ύX͑啝Ȍʂ̕ύXsꂽꍇɎsƂ {PSy[Wȍ~B wA second policy option for the FOMC would be to ease financial conditions through its communication, for example, by modifying its post-meeting statement.x KC_X̕ύX͂ǂƂbɂȂ̂B wAs I noted, the statement currently reflects the FOMCfs anticipation that exceptionally low rates will be warranted gfor an extended period,h contingent on economic conditions. A step the Committee could consider, if conditions called for it, would be to modify the language in the statement to communicate to investors that it anticipates keeping the target for the federal funds rate low for a longer period than is currently priced in markets. Such a change would presumably lower longer-term rates by an amount related to the revision in policy expectations.x xȂ݂̃KC_X̕ύXɂAs̋ZɊւ҂ωĒĂ݂iĂł̘bĂ̂ĂǂȂ̂Ǝv܂jƂ悤ȘbĂ܂BŁǍケ̎̎ĂijJi_and̎ЉĂ܂AeqaIɂ͕ʂɌŖȂƂFĂ܂B wA potential drawback of using the FOMCfs post-meeting statement to influence market expectations is that, at least without a more comprehensive framework in place, it may be difficult to convey the Committeefs policy intentions with sufficient precision and conditionality. The Committee will continue to actively review its communication strategy, with the goal of communicating its outlook and policy intentions as clearly as possible.x ̃KC_XȂ[NĂAč̌ꍇɁǍoώwWȂǂ̂悤Ȃ̂tH[JXďł̋Žp̂悤ȃR~bggŝ͓łBsʂɑ傫ȕω͌𑱂AKvɂȂꍇ͂܂ύXAƂɔ]Ӗ󂵂܂ǂǂł傤B Eߏt́ueesꂪ@\sSɂȂ̂Ń_vƂb ⊽AƂ́uC₪̃PbvYvƂ̂{Ȃ̂܂(^^)A{PTy[WB wA third option for further monetary policy easing is to lower the rate of interest that the Fed pays banks on the reserves they hold with the Federal Reserve System. Inside the Fed this rate is known as the IOER rate, the ginterest on excess reservesh rate. The IOER rate, currently set at 25 basis points, could be reduced to, say, 10 basis points or even to zero.x ߏtŎs͉Ƃʂ܂AƂbĂ̌オ_oR[i[B wHowever, under current circumstances, the effect of reducing the IOER rate on financial conditions in isolation would likely be relatively small. The federal funds rate is currently averaging between 15 and 20 basis points and would almost certainly remain positive after the reduction in the IOER rate. Cutting the IOER rate even to zero would be unlikely therefore to reduce the federal funds rate by more than 10 to 15 basis points. The effect on longer-term rates would probably be even less, although that effect would depend in part on the signal that market participants took from the action about the likely future course of policy.x eełPT|QOŁAĒɁi܂Œ̘bĂjǂ̒xe邩ƂΑ債e͖Ƃł܂ȁB wMoreover, such an action could disrupt some key financial markets and institutions.x XɁAƂƂŎs@\_L^RB wImportantly for the Fedfs purposes, a further reduction in very short-term interest rates could lead short-term money markets such as the federal funds market to become much less liquid, as near-zero returns might induce many participants and market-makers to exit.x Zs֌WҊ̓WJ(^^)B wIn normal times the Fed relies heavily on a well-functioning federal funds market to implement monetary policy, so we would want to be careful not to do permanent damage to that market.x {̎ĂƊw񂾂ƂłȁAƑÕ[iʓIɘajɒʂɏo҂ɍsĂiʂɂǂ{Ђƌ͖̂̂^^jƂĂ͎v̂ł܂B ECtڕWl̈グɊւĂ͂Ƀ_o wA rather different type of policy option, which has been proposed by a number of economists, would have the Committee increase its medium-term inflation goals above levels consistent with price stability.x hlẽuV[̃y[p[ňꎞbɂȂĂ܂āAS̎悤Ƀl^ɂȂĂ܂Ao[iL搶ؗɃ_oB wI see no support for this option on the FOMC.x (^^)B wConceivably, such a step might make sense in a situation in which a prolonged period of deflation had greatly weakened the confidence of the public in the ability of the central bank to achieve price stability, so that drastic measures were required to shift expectations. Also, in such a situation, higher inflation for a time, by compensating for the prior period of deflation, could help return the price level to what was expected by people who signed long-term contracts, such as debt contracts, before the deflation began.x ȉAڂĂ̂łǂAR[OcuV[̃y[p[oƌキ炢̍uiԑOɂЉƎv܂jŒJɃ_oĂ܂āÃWbNƂقړł񂷂̂ŁAp͊܂B eqa̒Rg[ƌv Ă܂penlbcv|ɂĂłAiIɂ͂̂̕łjWN\z[ł̍uȂ̂łAłeqa̐􃍃WbNǂ݂ĂũRg[v݂ȘbɂȂĂ̂I\VXȂƂł܂B ܂ǁK̃o[iL搶łAsȂ܂ʂ̃WbNoĒRg[̘b𖳂ɂĂ܂̂ł傤ǂ(^^)A_ƂċZɘaʂiC̉グɌqACt҂̈グɌq肵ꍇƂ̂͒Ȃ񂼕Cŏ㏸̂łāA[[ӖŋZɘǎʂ̔gy[ĝuvɒû͔ɊȂ̂悤ȋCłˁBlarƓ悤ɒ̔ǂǂsΎ^CgɂȂ邩vƂvĂ̂܂񂪁A̎sK͂Ⴂ܂A̔g傪}l^CYƂbɂȂ璷͍Xɏ㏸Ⴂ܂̂ŁAb͊ȒPł͂ȂƎv̂łˁB ꂱAƕč㏸iď㏸ĂȂjĂ܂ǂAꂪƏ㏸ĂPONRƂɂȂƂɍҁiƂÑjɂȂĂ肵ǂł傤˂Aƍ̓WJ𒭂߂Ǝv܂B [Θb̓[v܂Ap܂enlbcv|ȂłǁApȂTT܂A̕ĂǂɕĂƂȎĂłˁAĂ[̂ǎҗlwE܂̂ōČf(^^)B wMost members judged, in light of current conditions in the MBS market and the Committee's desire to normalize the composition of the Federal Reserve's portfolio, that it would be better to reinvest in longer-term Treasury securities than in MBS. While reinvesting in Treasury securities was seen as preferable given current market conditions, reinvesting in MBS might become desirable if conditions were to change.xiWenlbcv|A̍Čfj ˁAǂɕāuCommittee's desire to normalize the composition of the Federal Reserve's portfoliovȂǂƋłāA[ɐMpɘaȂ񂼂肽܂Ȃ͂͂Ƌ̂悤ł܂(^^)A|̘b₪s\C΂𗁂тđςȂƂɂȂł傤ȂƎvƁAɖ킢[̂܂BƂ[č̊ɘaKĒƌQO~ėʓIɘaƂ̂킩񌾂Ăǂ͂̕̕ɊւĂ̂ӌ𒸂̂ł܂ȂƂ(^^)B gbvɖ߂ QOPO^OX^OU uenlb̗ʓIɘaʓIɘaȂɂā^sꃁv ܂͎sꃁB j͗DƗ֔Ԃ̂łAɔł̂ǂm܂񂪑Oꂩ璴ɌB܂ĉaƂ̂Ȃ㏸Ƃ[ƂŔł̂łAj̏ꍇ͉̂O䋭Ă܂ƂfGȓWJɁBOĂ݂敨PKɑ΂ĂQON][Qы^PтTƂςɑfGȏ󋵂ɁB܂Ƃ܂Ŕ̂͂܂Ƃ̔łł傤˂ƂȂł傤ǂADłROOO~̋̂ɂȂɋȂłȂƁHHHHƎvĂ킯łi{jB ŁAʂ͂̒ʂB http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokusai/nyusatu/2010/resul037.htm ςUÂ̑؂VтRÂĂǂ񂾂Ă̂ƂŁAOꋭ͉ؗɑ厸AʏouԂ̍敨͍ɉƂςɂȌʂɂȂ܂B [ƂłȁAmɂb̊ԂĒ][łȂ̃bg}[PbgCpNgႭƂƂƍDDłƂ󋵂Ă܂̂ŁADƂ̃j[YłˁXɋ܂݂Ƃ悤ȊŁAuDœƂ̋j[YmFčXɋȂvƂꂪāAD̂тɐčslȓłˁB łȁAj̏ꍇĂ̑OT̒ɂĒ̎ȂĂ鏊ł܂āA܂Ƃ̂܂̂܂񂯂ǂAԂ̍łȂC킯A܂Ɩ߂Ă牟ڔƂlĂ󋵂łāA܂ł̏󋵂ƔwiႤŃl[mƎvĂ̂ŁAIɂ́HHHHƂȂł񂷂ǁAoŐɖƂ͎v܂ǉƂj̎sꂿł܂B enlbcv|ǂł݂̂łuቺvƂ http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20100810.htmiHTMŁj http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20100810.pdfiPDFŁj E܂͂edcX^bťiCʂɊւ iCʂɊւ镔Ɋւc_ǂłĂǂŌȂƎv̂łAWN\z[ł̃o[iLuł̌oςɊւ镔iďЉĂ܂񂪁AjƔĂȂƂł܂B wStaff Economic OutlookxƂƂŁAedc̃X^btɂiCʂp܂ƁB wIn the economic forecast prepared for the August FOMC meeting, the staff lowered its projection for the increase in real economic activity during the second half of 2010 but continued to anticipate a moderate strengthening of the expansion in 2011. x ƂƂŖ{N㔼̌ʂǂAŇʂ͈ɂ₩ɉ񕜂pƌŁB wThe softer tone of incoming economic data suggested that the pace of the expansion would be slower over the near term than previously projected. Financial conditions, however, became somewhat more supportive of economic growth. Interest rates on Treasury securities, corporate bonds, and mortgages moved down further over the intermeeting period; the dollar reversed its April to June appreciation; and equity prices edged higher. Over the medium term, the recovery in economic activity was expected to receive support from accommodative monetary policy, further improvement in financial conditions, and greater household and business confidence. x [ƂŁǍoσf[^キČoς̊gy[X͗\zアǂAZ͊iC񕜂̌㉟ɂȂĂĂA̓eƂĂ͒ቺĂAhቺĂ鎖Ȃǁi[̃XgXeXgʂ󂯂ĊPĂƂFɂȂĂ̂łƎv܂jB̒IȌʂƂẮAɘaIȋŽpA̍XȂZ̉PƌvƂ̃RtBfX܂鎖ɂČoϊ̊g傪\z܂ƁB wOver the forecast period, the increase in real GDP was projected to be sufficient to slowly reduce economic slack, although resource slack was still anticipated to remain quite elevated at the end of 2011.x Ⴀresource slack̉eŕ͂ǂȂ܂ƂłB wOverall inflation was projected to remain subdued over the next year and a half. The staff's forecasts for headline and core inflation in 2010 were revised up slightly in response to the higher prices of oil and other commodities and the depreciation of the dollar. Even so, the wide margin of economic slack was projected to contribute to some slowing in core inflation in 2011, though the extent of that slowing would be tempered by stable inflation expectations. x {IȌɂ͕ς͂ȂłȁB񂤂B Eenlb̌iCʂɂ wParticipants' Views on Current Conditions and the Economic OutlookxB wIn their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, meeting participants generally characterized the economic information received during the intermeeting period as indicating a slowing in the pace of recovery in output and employment in recent months.x [ƂŁÃf[^͉񕜂̃y[XĂ邱ƂAĂȘbłĈȉF̘b̂łǂǍ_̕łǂB wThus, while they saw growth as likely to be more modest in the near term, participants continued to anticipate that growth would pick up in 2011.x ʂ͉̂̉񕜂͉񕜂ƁB ŁAXɍڕʂɂ낢ȘbĂ܂āAꂪ܂FXƖʔ̂łApĂƃLȂ̂Ƃ̕OȂ̂ŁijrS[܂Č_̃pOt΁B wWeighing the available information, participants again expected the recovery to continue and to gather strength in 2011. Nonetheless, most saw the incoming data as indicating that the economy was operating farther below its potential than they had thought, that the pace of recovery had slowed in recent months, and that growth would be more modest during the second half of 2010 than they had anticipated at the time of the Committee's June meeting.x wSome policymakers whose forecasts for growth had been in the low end of the range of participants' earlier projections viewed the recent data as consistent with their earlier forecasts for a weak recovery. A few participants, observing that month-to-month data releases are noisy and subject to revision, did not see the recent data as clearly indicating a change in the outlook.x wMany policymakers judged that downside risks to the U.S. recovery had become somewhat larger; a few saw the incoming data as suggesting a greater risk that private demand for goods and services might not grow enough to offset waning fiscal stimulus and a smaller impetus from inventory restocking. In contrast, most saw a reduced risk of financial turmoil in Europe and attendant spillovers to U.S. financial markets.x ƂƂŁiԎ蔲j_ETChXNgƂbɂ͂ȂĂ̂łǂAŏ̏ɂ܂悤ɁAC̉񕜃ViÎ͕̂ςċȂŁAႠŒǉɘaɂ̂ƂƂǂȂ̂Ƃ͂܂ǂ˂B wPolicymakers generally saw the inflation outlook as little changed. They observed that a range of measures continued to indicate subdued underlying inflation and that growth in wages and compensation remained quite moderate. Many said they expected underlying inflation to stay, for some time, below levels they judged most consistent with the dual mandate to promote maximum employment and price stability.x ŁAȉłuft̃XN͋ɂ߂ďfBXCt̃XN͊gvƂ̂悤ȘbB wParticipants viewed the risk of deflation as quite small, but a number judged that the risk of further disinflation had increased somewhat despite the stability of longer-run inflation expectations. One noted that survey measures of longer-run inflation expectations had remained positive in Japan throughout that country's bout of deflation. A few saw the continuation of exceptionally accommodative monetary policy in the United States as posing some upside risk to inflation expectations and actual inflation in the medium run.x ǂɕāuT[xCɂ钷IȃCt҂ƃvXɂȂĂ{łftɂȂƂ܂ȁvƂbĂ̂[~OB EłĊ̐S̐􌈒̂Ƃłǂ OȂĂ܂܂AwCommittee Policy Actionx̏ʔ̂ňp͍XɑB wIn their discussion of monetary policy for the period ahead, Committee members agreed that it would be appropriate to maintain the target range of 0 to 1/4 percent for the federal funds rate. Members still saw the economic expansion continuing, and most believed that inflation was likely to stabilize near recent low readings in coming quarters and then gradually rise toward levels they consider more consistent with the Committee's dual mandate for maximum employment and price stability.x [Ƃō̓CViIɕῶȂ̂ˁB wNonetheless, members generally judged that the economic outlook had softened somewhat more than they had anticipated, particularly for the near term, and some saw increased downside risks to the outlook for both growth and inflation. Some members expressed a concern that in this context any further adverse shocks could have disproportionate effects, resulting in a significant slowing in growth going forward.x ܂sʂɊւĂ͌iCʂĐƃCtɊւ_ETChXN̔FƁB wWhile no member saw an appreciable risk of deflation, some judged that the risk of further near-term disinflation had increased somewhat. More broadly, members generally saw both employment and inflation as likely to fall short of levels consistent with the dual mandate for longer than had been anticipated. x ܂Ɋւ镔UɊւ鏊ł͒ڂĂ̂ł͂ȂƂ߂͏ɑẑłǂł傤B E̔̓}l[̊gł͂ȂċƂ؂̋c_ wAgainst this backdrop, the Committee discussed the implications for financial conditions and the economic outlook of continuing its policy of not reinvesting principal repayments received on MBS or maturing agency debt.x ƂƂłlaȑҋēȂꍇ̃CvP[VɂĂƂbĂ̂AꂪǂĂ؂ۂc_ɂȂĂAƂ͖̂{̂肾肵܂iOU肪łłjB wThe decline in mortgage rates since spring was generating increased mortgage refinancing activity that would accelerate repayments of principal on MBS held in the SOMA. Private investors would have to hold more longer-term securities as the Federal Reserve's holdings ran off, making longer-term interest rates somewhat higher than they would be otherwise.x laȑ҂ɂĎẑŁA̒̕،̔]͂ȂȂAʂƂċ㏸AƂ|[gtHIoXʓIȘbĂ܂BĐЉirłjWN\z[ł̃o[iLułl^UĂ̂łAǂenlbIɂ͎YɊւāu|[gtHIoXʁvu̒ቺvIȃWbNŒʂƂĂ̂ł傤ȂƎv܂B wMost members thought that the resulting tightening of financial conditions would be inappropriate, given the economic outlook.x Ӂ[B wHowever, members noted that the magnitude of the tightening was uncertain, and a few thought that the economic effects of reinvesting principal from agency debt and MBS likely would be quite small.x ɘb؂Ȃ̂FĂ̂ÁuߌʁvɊւĂǂ̒x͕̂smŁÁu̍ēɊւʂ͋ɂ߂ď񂶂l[mvƎwEĂƌɂenlbo[̗ǐŜ͂ł傤HHH wMost members judged, in light of current conditions in the MBS market and the Committee's desire to normalize the composition of the Federal Reserve's portfolio, that it would be better to reinvest in longer-term Treasury securities than in MBS. While reinvesting in Treasury securities was seen as preferable given current market conditions, reinvesting in MBS might become desirable if conditions were to change.x lar̎s󋵂ƁAeqãoXV[g̓ePƂϓ_炷ƁAlarҋ̍ē͂larł͂Ȃȏ،ōŝK؂ƂƂ̂悤łȁAlar̍w͂lars̊ωꍇɍsƁB wA few members worried that reinvesting principal from agency debt and MBS in Treasury securities could send an inappropriate signal to investors about the Committee's readiness to resume large-scale asset purchases.x ̃o[͂̌肪ԈVOisɑ鎖OƂȁB wAnother member argued that reinvesting repayments of principal from agency debt and MBS, thereby postponing a reduction in the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, was likely to complicate the eventual exit from the period of exceptionally accommodative monetary policy and could have adverse macroeconomic consequences in future years.x ēsɂď̏o􂪍ɂȂ鎖OlƂȁB EƂƂŉƃ}l^[ł͂Ȃōē̎{Ƃ wAll but one member concluded that it would be appropriate to begin reinvesting principal received from agency debt and MBS held in the SOMA by purchasing longer-term Treasury securities in order to keep constant the face value of securities held in the SOMA and thus avoid the upward pressure on longer-term interest rates that might result if those holdings were allowed to decline.x ueqa̎̈͗ʓIɘavƂbɂȂĂ܂A܂̔gĕʂ̓}l^[g傷Ƃ[g̘bɂȂƎv̂łAԂ񖳗؂Ƃv܂񂯂ǂAenlbł͒Y̔Ɋւāuւ̉evlĎ{ƂWbNœ˂ł͗lB łAenlb̐ʂ̑[uuʓIɘavȂ̂uʓIvȂ̂Ƃb܂A͂enlbIȃWbN͗ʂ̈ێ͋㏸}ƂĂǂȂ̂ƂA܂}l^[̘b͓epƂĒɒڂƂtɂĂłȁB ܂ČtƂĂWbNoǂA܂ۂ̘b͕ʂłƂɂȂ̂܂񂪁A͒sRg[悤ƎvĎsŔƂƂɂȂƁAꂱꒃȗʂ𔃂ȂƂȂȂ悤ȋC܂̂ŁA܂肱́u[gv̘bƎ̃WbNŎi߂ĂȋCłBiC񕜂ăCt҂オΒ₪X𔃂Ă͕Cŏ㏸łEEEEE ƁA܂}jÂ͎v̂łAƒK̃o[iL搶́uׂ񂾂IvƂȂł傤ˁBȉ܂łXɌʂǉɘaƂA͌Ăoc[̌𑱂ׂłƂӌ̂ł܂ňp邠B wSeveral members emphasized that in addition to continuing to develop and test instruments to facilitate an eventual exit from the period of unusually accommodative monetary policy, the Committee would need to consider steps it could take to provide additional policy stimulus if the outlook were to weaken appreciably further.x ƁAx̃KC_X͕ωKvȂƂb̂ňpB wGiven the softer tone of recent data and the more modest near-term outlook, members agreed that some changes to the statement's characterization of the economic and financial situation were necessary.x ȉ̓z[jbO̔ΗR̘błA܂͂̒ʂȂ̂ŊB gbvɖ߂ QOPO^OX^OR usꃁ^o[iL̒YgɊւiX̃WN\z[l^jv sꃁ ̍słA牽܂܂キĂPDWxɂȂiȂ񂾂܂ɂhɓ̂ŒiXꒆ̋ǂȂȂė܂jƎv炻̌̔Ŗ߂܂āAiW\ƎvĂ獡x͗֔ԃIyƂł܂ł̊B ͑Oɂ₽敨̏oŁAȂɔ񂾂낤ȂƑz܂ÅԂɒ̋Cz\ł悤ȋC܂BɂȂƈ]ĐÂȓWJɂȂ݂łAۂ܂wjwjɂȂĐ敨ROK̂PSQ~QPKɑ΂ĂPONV͂TъÂ̂PDPPOȋO܂ł̊x[XƂSшႤ̂łPDOVOɂȂ܂jłQONJg͂VтTÂ̂PDWQTƂ܂΂WJɁB TΗjɓDɂ͕ϗDiPOO~VWKVPQOiPDUN[|ˁjPTԂƂłPDWQTƂƂŁAiɂĂS~̉łS~(^^)BȂ݂ɐj̈PDTPT̂ŁAl͂S~ȏ̉Ȃ̂łǂAؗjȍ~ɕς̂͂搶ƍl܂ƂʋׂƌƂɂȂĂ܂˂Ȃ̂I\VXB܂ƂȂ\グ܂A搶Œ݂ȃe[}ň꒚Ă݂܂IȓȂ̂AƂ̕f[VĂꍇɔKv̂ɁAu̕lオ蕝͑傫ɁA̗肪Ԏvmۂłf炵vƂqɏĔĂl~ôuvԂɂȂĂ邾Ȃ̂͑܂񂪁A܂ʊ֌W͂ƂƂĂʂƂĂV[iCł(^^)B ƂŁAZȂłAfb͂܂ĂĂODPOTxɂȂĂ܂ǂA̗Łuقف[vƎvĂ̂́ÅԒZ̃[g낭ۏ㏸ȂƂłB܂ҁiƂwbWƂjłODPOR̂Ƃ悤ȃxɋ̂͗ǂƂāAςڐ旘͖łˁAƂ󋵂ɂȂĂfbxł͊ԎڂɍȂł蔃Ă܂āAfbxƂ̍ŎɂƂlȊO̔ĂĂł˂Ƃł܂BޔĂAƂł͂ƐłȂȋCB܂ǂłǁAẐƂ͎]芴vX܂Ă̂ł͂Ȃł傤˂B o[iL̒ǉɘaIvVɊւiX̃WN\z[j http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100827a.pdf 炷ƑO̘̕bɂ悤ȋCłȂ̂łA{PQy[Wȍ~́wPolicy Options for Further Easingx̏B wNotwithstanding the fact that the policy rate is near its zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve retains a number of tools and strategies for providing additional stimulus. I will focus here on three that have been part of recent staff analyses and discussion at FOMC meetings: (1) conducting additional purchases of longer-term securities, (2) modifying the Committeefs communication, and (3) reducing the interest paid on excess reserves. I will also comment on a fourth strategy, proposed by several economists--namely, that the FOMC increase its inflation goals.x [ƂŁAǉɘaIvVƂĂenlbŌĂ̂ƂāAiPjY̒ǉwiQjKC_X̕ύXȂǂ̂悤ȃR~jP[V̕ύXiRjߏɑ΂ẗAƂ̂āAɉāiSjCtڕW̐lグAƂbĂ܂Ƃ̂͐ƏƂŁB ŁAY̒ǉwɊւĂ̐p悤ȂƂŁB wA first option for providing additional monetary accommodation, if necessary, is to expand the Federal Reservefs holdings of longer-term securities.x wAs I noted earlier, the evidence suggests that the Fedfs earlier program of purchases was effective in bringing down term premiums and lowering the costs of borrowing in a number of private credit markets. I regard the program (which was significantly expanded in March 2009) as having made an important contribution to the economic stabilization and recovery that began in the spring of 2009.Likewise, the FOMCfs recent decision to stabilize the Federal Reservefs securities holdings should promote financial conditions supportive of recovery.x ̌ʂɊւ͈pÔقɂib̏炵čŌ̕pĂ̂瓖OȂ̂łAjłǁAY̖ړIƌʂɑ΂āüvƂbĂ̂łAۖƂĂ̋̈Ƃ̂́Aɂ܂悤ɁuXNv~Av̈ɂ͌qƎviAs@\Ȃĉi@\󂵂Ăׂɗ]vɂĂ܂XNv~ÄɂĂlarȂǂ̋ቺƂƁĵłAs@\ʂɉĂƂɒY̔sĂAQOOXN̂R㔼ȍ~̕č̂悤ɁAʂɂiC񕜊҂Ȃǂ璷̂̂͏㏸ĂSȂ̂ł܂āAǉŃgW[̍wƂƂɁu[gvł̐̓WbNIɋꂵƎv̂łǂˁB wI believe that additional purchases of longer-term securities, should the FOMC choose to undertake them, would be effective in further easing financial conditions.x Ƃ͌A[g̐Ƃ͔ɋꂵƎv܂B͂̊Ԃɂuedc̃oXV[gǧʁvƂbɔɕςĂ̂[~OŁAʓIɘaƐMpɘaӐ}IȂ̂Ӑ}IȂ̂iԂӐ}Ił傤jȂbĂ̂ŁA̒ʓIȌʂɊւl@ɔ܂܂Řbi߂ĂȂƎv̂łˁB wHowever, the expected benefits of additional stimulus from further expanding the Fedfs balance sheet would have to be weighed against potential risks and costs.x ܂OႠOłAû悤Ȑɂ͌ʂ邯ǂAݓIȃXNRXg܂vČbo[iL񂪂Ƃ(^^)BuPbv𔃂v̌ĂuwRv^[ExvlƂ͓vȂłȂƐ\܂A܂F͐l̍ɑ΂鐭񌾂ȂĂȂƂqVqVƊāAɖ킢̐[isAƂj߂ł܂ȂEEEEE ŁAȉXN̐B wOne risk of further balance sheet expansion arises from the fact that, lacking much experience with this option, we do not have very precise knowledge of the quantitative effect of changes in our holdings on financial conditions. x Yw̒ʓIʂɂĂ͌oȂ̂ŗǂƂȁB wIn particular, the impact of securities purchases may depend to some extent on the state of financial markets and the economy; for example, such purchases seem likely to have their largest effects during periods of economic and financial stress, when markets are less liquid and term premiums are unusually high. The possibility that securities purchases would be most effective at times when they are most needed can be viewed as a positive feature of this tool. However, uncertainty about the quantitative effect of securities purchases increases the difficulty of calibrating and communicating policy responses.x ƂƂŁAł̓_Ă܂ǂAY̔ʂ͑ΏۂƂȂs̎s@\ቺAቺăXgXɎNĂ鎞ɑ傫Ȍʂ𔭊邩ǂAȂƂɂĂǂȂ̂ƂwEĂ܂ȁB wAnother concern associated with additional securities purchases is that substantial further expansions of the balance sheet could reduce public confidence in the Fedfs ability to execute a smooth exit from its accommodative policies at the appropriate time.Even if unjustified, such a reduction in confidence might lead to an undesired increase in inflation expectations. (Of course, if inflation expectations were too low, or even negative, an increase in inflation expectations could become a benefit.) x ͈ȑOwEĂbŁAoXgɂĂedc̏o􂪍ɂȂƂLꍇɁA]܂ȂʂɂȂł傤ƂbB wTo mitigate this concern, the Federal Reserve has expended considerable effort in developing a suite of tools to ensure that the exit from highly accommodative policies can be smoothly accomplished when appropriate, and FOMC participants have spoken publicly about these tools on numerous occasions.x 邽߂ɐFXȃc[pӂĂ܂A̓_͑vƁB wIndeed, by providing maximum clarity to the public about the methods by which the FOMC will exit its highly accommodative policy stance--and thereby helping to anchor inflation expectations--the Committee increases its own flexibility to use securities purchases to provide additional accommodation, should conditions warrant.x Ƃ܂܂ŊۈpƂŁi蔲ɂ܂łjԂȂ̂ő̎iɊւĂ͏TɁB łȁA厖ȂƂȂ̂łQx܂(^^)APbv𔃂ƂĂwRv^[Ex搶û悤Ȑɂ͌ʂł͂ȂRXgƃXN܂vƂɂȂƂ͉ƌɖ킢̂̂łƂł(^^)B gbvɖ߂ QOPO^OX^OQ u}\IGkƂ̑Xv WN\z[͂ǂƂ˂݂͂Ȃ悤ɁijB Ă搶ʂȂ̂łHH 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ŁA{̂͑l^C}CȂ̂ŁAnłenlb̂Ucv|l^ƏԂ̂B܂艴lYłB

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20100623.htm

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wAs background for the Committee's continuing consideration of its portfolio management policies, the Manager gave a presentation on alternative strategies for reinvesting the proceeds from maturing Treasury securities.x

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wUnder current practice, the Desk reinvests the proceeds of maturing Treasury coupon securities in new Treasury securities that are issued on the date the older securities mature, allocating the investments across the new securities in proportion to the issuance amounts.x

wThe Manager presented two alternatives to the status quo. First, the Committee could consider halting all reinvestment of the proceeds of maturing securities. Such a strategy would shrink the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and reduce the quantity of reserve balances in the banking system gradually over time.x

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wSecond, the Committee could reinvest the proceeds of maturing securities only in new issues of Treasury securities with relatively short maturities--bills only, or bills as well as coupon issues with terms of three years or less. This strategy would maintain the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet but would reduce somewhat the average maturity of the portfolio and increase its liquidity.x

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wOne participant favored halting all reinvestment, and many saw benefits to eventually adopting an approach of reinvesting in bills and shorter-term coupon issues to shift the maturity composition of the portfolio toward the structure that had prevailed prior to the financial crisis.x

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wHowever, the Committee made no change to its reinvestment policy at this meeting.x

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wContinuing a discussion from previous meetings, participants again addressed issues regarding asset sales. Participants continued to agree that gradual sales of MBS should be undertaken, at some point, to speed the return to a Treasury-securities-only portfolio.x

܂ۂɂǂ̂炢̎vꂪ̂͂ꂾĂĂς蔻Ȃ̂łǂAlarɊւĂu点̂Ȃ猸炵vƂȂ̂ł傤B

wA few participants supported beginning such sales fairly soon; they noted that, given the evident demand in the market for safe, longer-term assets, modest sales of MBS might not put much, if any, upward pressure on long-term interest rates or be disruptive to the functioning of financial markets. However, many participants still saw asset sales as potentially tightening financial conditions to some extent.x

{s̒̐lIɐ\グ܂Ƒlarp̋Zւ̉eāuto some extentvƂxȂƎv̂ł(^^)A{̏ꍇ͉^pVbNƌُ̂Ȃ܂ł̃gE}ɂȂĂāiĉ^p̃AiEXő\̂ł͂܂A\̌Ă_ƂĕʂɂāAPɃgK[ɂȂł͂ȂƎv̂łǂˁjAs琭{傪Ypꍇ̃CpNgߑɌςĂ邾Ȃ̂܂i劾jB܂[B

wMost participants continued to judge it appropriate to defer asset sales for some time; several noted the modest weakening in the economic outlook since the Committee's last meeting as an additional reason to do so.x

wA majority of participants continued to anticipate that asset sales would start after the Committee had begun to firm policy by increasing short-term interest rates; such an approach would postpone asset sales until the economic recovery was well established and maintain short-term interest rates as the Committee's key monetary policy tool.x

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wA few participants suggested selling MBS and using the proceeds to purchase Treasury securities of comparable duration, arguing that doing so would hasten the move toward a Treasury-securities-only portfolio without tightening financial conditions.x

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wParticipants agreed that it would be important to maintain flexibility regarding the appropriate timing and pace of asset sales, given the uncertainties associated with the unprecedented size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and its effects on financial conditions. Overall, participants emphasized that any decision to engage in asset sales would need to be communicated well in advance of the initiation of such transactions, and that sales should be conducted at a gradual pace and potentially be adjusted in response to developments in economic and financial conditions.x

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http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2010/mpc1007.pdf

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wThe Committee considered arguments in favour of a modest easing in the stance of monetary policy. The softening in the medium-term outlook for GDP growth over recent months would put further downwards pressure on inflation, once the impact of temporary factors had waned. Pay growth had remained subdued and there was little sign of a material pickup in medium-term inflation expectations. A further modest monetary stimulus would act to offset the softening in demand prospects and make it more likely that the inflation target would be met in the medium term.x

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wBut there were also arguments in favour of a modest tightening in the stance of monetary policy. Inflation was likely to remain above target for some months and there was a risk that medium-term inflation expectations would rise. The resilience of inflation over recent months had suggested that the downward impact of spare capacity could be weaker than expected and this created uncertainty around the extent to which inflation would fall back in the future. Demand growth had bounced back internationally, although the geographical distribution remained uneven. The average growth rate of the main measures of UK nominal demand in recent quarters had been around or above historical rates.x

܂̓Ct̘bĂ̂ŗ͔Ղ̂łAoόʂĂ̂ɋZ߂Ăǂ̂Ƃ_̖肪܂ȁB

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http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100721a.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100721a.pdf

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wThe economic expansion that began in the middle of last year is proceeding at a moderate pace, supported by stimulative monetary and fiscal policies. Although fiscal policy and inventory restocking will likely be providing less impetus to the recovery than they have in recent quarters, rising demand from households and businesses should help sustain growth. In particular, real consumer spending appears to have expanded at about a 2-1/2 percent annual rate in the first half of this year, with purchases of durable goods increasing especially rapidly. However, the housing market remains weak, with the overhang of vacant or foreclosed houses weighing on home prices and construction.x

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wMy colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and I expect continued moderate growth, a gradual decline in the unemployment rate, and subdued inflation over the next several years. In conjunction with the June FOMC meeting, Board members and Reserve Bank presidents prepared forecasts of economic growth, unemployment, and inflation for the years 2010 through 2012 and over the longer run. The forecasts are qualitatively similar to those we released in February and May, although progress in reducing unemployment is now expected to be somewhat slower than we previously projected, and near-term inflation now looks likely to be a little lower. x

[Ƃňɂ₩ȉ񕜂݁AUenlbł̒IȌʂ͂QŤʂƑ傫͕ςĂȂAƌAԏdvȕ̎ƂƕɊւāuƗ̒ቺX[ŁA߂^[̃Cťʂ኱ĂvƉĂ̂Ƀ[~OłB

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wOne factor underlying the Committeefs somewhat weaker outlook is that financial conditions--though much improved since the depth of the financial crisis--have become less supportive of economic growth in recent months.x

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wLike financial conditions generally, the state of the U.S. banking system has also improved significantly since the worst of the crisis. Loss rates on most types of loans seem to be peaking, and, in the aggregate, bank capital ratios have risen to new highs. However, many banks continue to have a large volume of troubled loans on their books, and bank lending standards remain tight. With credit demand weak and with banks writing down problem credits, bank loans outstanding have continued to contract. Small businesses, which depend importantly on bank credit, have been particularly hard hit.x

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wFirst, in response to the periods of intense illiquidity and dysfunction in financial markets that characterized the crisis, the Federal Reserve undertook a range of measures and set up emergency programs designed to provide liquidity to financial institutions and markets in the form of fully secured, mostly short-term loans.x

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wA second major component of the Federal Reservefs response to the financial crisis and recession has involved both standard and less conventional forms of monetary policy.x

uWIю኱Ił͂ȂZvƂ͉ȂHƂłÁuvi͕WIȐjƁAuԎ̂悤Ȃ́v悤łȁB܂A̕ł̂悤ɐĂ܂B

wAnd, as indicated in the statement released after the June meeting, the FOMC continues to anticipate that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.x

ققA́uless conventionalvȂłł(^^)BŁA̎YAƂ؂蕪ɂȂĂ܂āB

wIn addition to the very low federal funds rate, the FOMC has provided monetary policy stimulus through large-scale purchases of longer-term Treasury debt, federal agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). A range of evidence suggests that these purchases helped improve conditions in mortgage markets and other private credit markets and put downward pressure on longer-term private borrowing rates and spreads.x

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wOf course, even as the Federal Reserve continues prudent planning for the ultimate withdrawal of extraordinary monetary policy accommodation, we also recognize that the economic outlook remains unusually uncertain.x

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http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech438.pdf
"Why is CPI Inflation so high?" Remarks by PAUL FISHER

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wAnnual CPI Inflation reached 3.7% in April (Chart 1). Given the Monetary Policy Committeefs remit to target CPI inflation of 2%, you might well want to ask ghow has inflation got so high and what is the MPC going to do about it?h I intend to tackle those questions head on this morning and, in the process, illustrate some of the challenges the Committee faces in setting monetary policy.x

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wOne might have expected a recession of this depth to exert considerable downwards pressure on inflation - such that the current CPI inflation rate could easily have been negative. The recovery in inflation seems to reflect two factors. First, given the scale of the fall in demand, the downwards pressure from the recession doesnft appear to have been as strong as it might have been. Second, there have been a number of temporary factors pushing upwards.x

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wIt has been clear that there has been an unusual response from companies and their employees. Many firms have sought to retain staff wherever possible, rather than shed them as in previous downturns - hours have been shortened and wages frozen or even cut where possible, rather than making people redundant. Large firms with smaller suppliers have tried to work with suppliers to keep their supply chains intact, which has helped smaller firms to survive. Many employees - at least in the private sector - have been willing to forgo income in order to retain their jobs.x

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wOverall, the fall in output does not appear to have done as much damage to employment and firm survival as one might have expected. At the same time, the implication of business surveys is that the degree of spare capacity in firms is rather less than implied by the fall in output. So estimates of the gap between overall demand and the economyfs capacity to produce goods and services - an indicator of inflationary pressure known as the eoutput gapf- are extremely uncertain at the current juncture. The eoutput gapf appears to be much smaller than the fall in demand alone would have suggested, but there is little evidence of widespread destruction of supply capacity.x

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wWhatever the balance between demand and supply, it seems that many firms have maintained prices, not cut them, in the face of weak demand. That may have been a rational response. In order to survive they needed to maximise their present cash flow and they would only have cut prices if the demand response was likely to outweigh the lost revenue.x

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wThe explanations for these changes in behaviour and their inflationary consequences are likely to be many and varied. And it may be some time before we can be sure which of many hypotheses are correct. But one factor we know is that interest rates have been at an all-time historic low during this recession (Chart 7). And Bank Rate started to fall well before the trough in output. The effect of this on, for example, firmsf cash flow, has been very significant and was reinforced by the effects of the asset purchase programme reducing corporate borrowing costs.x

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wIt seems a reasonable starting assumption that behaviour during the recession should be broadly symmetric during the recovery. When demand growth strengthens, output could be flexibly ratcheted up, reversing the processes seen during the downturn.x

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wIf so, then it is unlikely that substantial inflationary pressure would be generated as the result of a recovery in demand: there will be plenty of capacity within firms and a ready supply of labour, both of which should help to keep costs subdued. But this is clearly a major uncertainty and hence a risk in our projections of future inflation. Not only has the UK economy behaved differently from its previous experience, it has also behaved differently from other countries. In the United States for example, the fall in employment relative to output has been larger than in the United Kingdom (Chart 8).x

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wWeak downwards pressure on inflation from the recession can only go so far in helping understand recent movements in inflation. It cannot explain why inflation has been rising recently. For that we need to look at a series of shocks to relative prices that have put temporary upwards pressure on CPI inflation. These shocks include the change in the VAT rate; changes in oil (and hence petrol) prices and changes in the prices of imports relative to domestic goods and services.x

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wThe recent high rate of CPI inflation can be largely attributed to a number of temporary factors, combined with weak downwards pressure on inflation from the subdued level of demand. Nevertheless, given the expected degree of spare capacity in the economy over the next few years, and that the temporary factors should wear off, the most likely outcome is that inflation falls back to below target over the next couple of years as shown in the May Inflation Report (Chart 12). On that basis it was sensible not to try and offset the recent rise in inflation by tightening policy.x

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wBut let me be clear about the risks. Our central expectations could be wrong. Certainly the inflation data have tended to consistently surprise on the upside, month-by-month. What if spare capacity continues to exert much less restraint on inflation than anticipated? Or perhaps current data estimates have significantly underestimated demand and output growth? Or the exchange rate effect is bigger than incorporated in the projections? We could also be wrong in the other direction: downside pressures on UK output growth (Chart 13) could yet lead to an even bigger fall in inflation than the central case. And, of course, there could be further shocks in either direction.x

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wSo it is important to use whatever cross-checks on our projections that we can. One way to do that is to look for any nominal indicators that might signal risks of persistently above target inflation in the medium term, such as money or wage growth.x

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wUnderlying money growth is currently just over 1% on an annual basis. And underlying wage growth is around 2%. There are some tentative signs that money and wage growth are rising, but neither of these figures are even close to being consistent with above-target inflation in the medium term.x

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wTaking these indicators together with the degree of slack in the economy ? and given some of the factors likely to restrain growth in the UK and in Europe ? the economics of the situation does suggest that inflation should fall back from its current high point. But there are risks on both sides.x

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wOn the one hand we need to be sensitive to the risk of tightening policy
prematurely, stifling the nascent recovery.x

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wIn that case, some of the flexible response to the recession could be swept away, delivering higher unemployment, more company failures and the risk of inflation significantly undershooting the target. The risk of deflation - which prompted the start of the MPCfs asset purchases in 2009 - may have faded, but it hasnft gone away and would require greater efforts to deal with, if it materialised now.x

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wOn the other hand, should it appear likely that inflationary pressure is sustained at a higher level into the medium term, then it is clear what our mandate would require us to do. The MPC has the tools at its disposal to tighten monetary conditions, both in the form of raising Bank Rate and by selling the assets that we bought in 2009 as part of the quantitative easing programme.x

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Z̔szɂȂĂ󂾂

http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokusai/tbill/tbillauct/auct220630.htm
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http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html

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http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/20100053_all.en.html

Fixed Rate: 1 %
% of All. at Fixed Rate: 100
Tot Amount Allotted: 131933.19 mn
Tot Bid Amount: 131933.19 mn
Tot Number of Bidders: 171

ƌłAL̂ŕtĂB

http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-16082220100630?sp=true
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